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DE FACTO MANDATORY: A QUANTITATIVE
ASSESSMENT OF REASONABLENESS REVIEW
AFTER BOOKER
Carrie Leonetti*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s failure to explain how the two conflicting
objectives of United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan—for
district courts to consider the unique characteristics and circumstances
of individual offenders and offenses, and for appellate courts to re-
view sentences uniformly for reasonableness—could and should be
balanced has resulted in disuniformity within and among the circuits
as to whether the Sixth Amendment requires them to approve virtu-
ally any sentence within the statutory range. Gall v. United States has
emboldened some district courts, while others remain highly guideline
bound, at least in part because of the “safe harbor” that a guideline
sentence can give on appeal.
All of this doctrinal uncertainty has resulted in a division among
federal circuit courts of appeal as to the proper allocation of discretion
between trial and appellate courts.  Some circuits vest an inordinate
amount of discretion at the district court level, which is unreviewable
in practice.  At the other end of the spectrum, other circuits vest much
more discretion at the appellate level, in one of two different ways:
either they retain discretion to require district courts to vary from
guideline sentences for defendants whose crimes they believe the
guidelines to be flawed; or they retain the discretion to require district
courts to impose within-guideline sentences in all but the most ex-
traordinary cases by setting a high threshold for sentencing variances
to be affirmed on appeal.  The result is a patchwork of guideline sen-
tencing in which defendants’ sentences are dictated more by geogra-
phy than by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
* Carrie Leonetti, Associate Professor and Dean’s Distinguished Faculty Fellow, University
of Oregon School of Law.  She wishes to thank Elisabeth Waner for her research assistance on a
very complicated project.  She also wishes to thank the staff of Pizza Schmizza in Raleigh Hills,
who never once questioned the proportionality of exchanging eight hours of free wifi for the
purchase price of one Diet Coke (with unlimited refills) because she has been forcibly ejected
from restaurants in the past for less.
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While other commentators have offered their own angle as to this
disuniformity at a doctrinal and/or normative level, this Article seeks
instead to approach it from a descriptive and empirical perspective, by
attempting to quantify it numerically.  It presents the results of a sur-
vey of federal appellate court cases decided after Booker challenging
the substantive reasonableness of sentences imposed by the district
court. The data suggest that the enormous discretion currently given
to judges has resulted in substantial geographic disparity in applica-
tion of the guidelines, district to district and circuit to circuit.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is an inherent tension between the sentencing uniformity that
guideline systems were designed to promote and the judges’ ability to
craft fair sentences for individual offenders based on their particular-
ized circumstances.  Giving too much discretion to the sentencing
judge can lead to offenders receiving dissimilar sentences for similar
conduct, based solely upon the ideology of the judge that they drew.
Giving too little discretion to the sentencing judge can lead to offend-
ers with dissimilar crimes and circumstances receiving the same sen-
tence when different sentences may be more just because the
mandatory sentencing scheme failed to consider certain individualized
circumstances.  The benefits and disadvantages to both discretionary
and mandatory sentencing schemes have caused the pendulum to
swing repeatedly between the two.
II. HARD CASES, BAD LAW
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA).1  The
most important provisions govern the imposition of noncapital
sentences in federal court2 and create the United States Sentencing
Commission (USSC).3  The USSC’s mission was to create sentencing
guidelines that reduce “unwarranted sentencing disparities” and im-
plement the primary purposes of criminal punishment in a just and
rational manner,4 which led to the adoption of the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines (USSG) in 1987.5
1. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).  The SRA was enacted as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–995 (2012).
4. Id.
5. See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 228–29 (1993).  In
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Before the USSG were put into place, a wide disparity existed
among the sentences given by different judges and even among
sentences given by a single judge.6  There was virtually no substantive
appellate review of sentences in federal criminal cases at that time, as
long as the sentence imposed was within the applicable statutory
range.7  “Although the appellate courts lacked the power to review . . .
the length[ ] of sentences imposed by district courts, they retained
some ability to review the process through which sentences were de-
termined.  The outer limits of the district court’s discretion were set by
concepts of due process.”8  The historical underpinnings of the USSC
and the guidelines appeared more than a decade before the enactment
of the SRA when, in 1973, Marvin E. Frankel published Criminal
Sentences: Law Without Order.9  Judge Frankel proposed three key
the 1970s and 1980s, conservatives concerned about what they perceived as too-light sentences
from lenient judges and liberals concerned about sentencing disparities joined forces in a sen-
tencing-reform effort that ultimately became guideline sentencing. See JUSTICE KENNEDY
COMM’N, ABA, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 14–16
(2004) [hereinafter KENNEDY COMM’N REPORT], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_kennedy_JusticeKennedyCommission
Reports.authcheckdam.pdf.
6. See David Fisher, Fifth Amendment—Prosecutorial Discretion Not Absolute: Constitutional
Limits on Decision Not to File Substantial Assistance Motions, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
744, 745 (1993) (“Prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act, federal judges enjoyed
extremely broad discretion in sentencing.  A judge could impose any sentence she thought was
proper as long as it did not exceed the statutory maximum.”).
7. Id. (noting that before the SRA, there was no appellate review of sentencing decisions);
Stith & Koh, supra note 5, at 226 (“For over two hundred years, there was virtually no appellate R
review of the trial judge’s exercise of sentencing discretion.”); see e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 290 & n.16 (1983) (“[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for
that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.”); Dorszynski v.
United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (reiterating the “general proposition that once it is deter-
mined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed,
appellate review is at an end”); Herron v. United States, 551 F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The
severity of a sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be reviewed.”); United States
v. Cavazos, 530 F.2d 4, 5 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusing to engage in a substantive review of Cavazos’s
sentence because it was within the applicable statutory range). See generally Appellate Review of
Sentences: A Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, 32 F.R.D. 249 (1962).
8. KENNEDY COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 14 n.17; see, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 R
U.S. 443, 447–49 (1972) (vacating sentences from prior uncounseled convictions on due-process
grounds); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (holding that a violation of due process
occurred when a sentence was based on erroneous factual information); United States v. Cle-
ments, 634 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1981) (refusing to “review the severity of a sentence imposed
within statutory limits,” but “carefully scrutiniz[ing] the judicial process by which the punish-
ment was imposed”); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[The] discre-
tion [of sentencing judges] is not, and has never been absolute, and while the appellate courts
have little if any power to review substantively the length of sentences, it is our duty to insure
that rudimentary notions of fairness are observed in the process at which the sentence is deter-
mined.” (citation omitted)).
9. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
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reforms to the federal sentencing system: (1) the creation of a perma-
nent sentencing commission of sentencing experts; (2) the creation of
a numerical guideline system; and (3) the requirement of meaningful
appellate review of sentencing decisions to ensure a reasonable degree
of “consistency and uniformity.”10
The USSG, which went into effect in 1987, provided detailed gui-
dance for federal judges in the exercise of their sentencing authority.11
Superimposed on the existing, typically broad, indeterminate statutory
ranges of punishment was a class of binding, narrower guideline provi-
sions that in many cases were driven by extremely detailed sentencing
factors.12  The guidelines provided that various aggravating and miti-
gating factors were to be given specific weights (upward or downward
adjustments).13  The guidelines also significantly restricted judges’
ability to consider many offenders’ personal characteristics, like age,
family circumstances, and substance-abuse history, instead focusing on
an offender’s prior criminal record as the most important factor.14  In
order to “depart” from the prescribed guideline sentence, a district
judge had to either justify a departure by reference to factors specified
in the Guidelines as appropriate grounds for doing so15 or certify that
“there exist[ed] an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sen-
tencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in
a sentence different from that described.”16
10. Id. at 115–19.  Judge Frankel’s anti-overcriminalization and anti-discrimination proposal,
however, was ultimately hijacked by law-and-order politics. See Stith & Koh, supra note 5, at R
226 (“The introduction of parole in the federal system in 1910 signified a reduction in formal
judicial authority over the duration of prison terms . . . .”).
11. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. § 5.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987).
12. See id. § 2D1.1 (providing differing offense levels based on a long list of drug types and
quantities).
13. See id. §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.3 (requiring that a defendant’s sentence be given an upward or
downward adjustment for criminal history that is under- or over-represented by the criminal-
history score).
14. Id. §§ 5H1.1–1.2; see KENNEDY COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 35–37.  Chapter 5, Part R
H of the guidelines lists factors that the USSC determined were “not ordinarily relevant to the
determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range”: age;
educational and vocational skills; mental and emotional conditions; physical condition; history of
substance abuse; employment record; family or community ties; socio-economic status; military
record; history of charitable good works; and lack of guidance as a youth. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1–1.12. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(d)–(e) (1988) (dictating
that certain offender characteristics, like socioeconomic status and family ties, were generally
inappropriate considerations).
15. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1–1.12 (enumerating permissible
grounds for departure from a guideline sentence).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (1988); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL109.txt unknown Seq: 5 10-APR-17 11:07
2016] DE FACTO MANDATORY 55
In 2005, the pendulum swung back.  In the consolidated cases of
United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan,17 the Supreme
Court’s holding on the constitutionality of the guidelines proclaimed
that, in some circumstances, judicial fact-finding in connection with
mandatory sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment’s
jury-trial guarantee.18  The solution that the Court selected in Booker
to remedy the Sixth Amendment problem, however, was to split the
baby—attempting to retain the uniform guidance of the sentencing
guidelines while increasing the discretion that trial courts had to im-
pose non-guideline sentences in appropriate cases.19  The resulting re-
medial holding of Booker rendered the USSG advisory only.20  While
the old mandatory guidelines had required judges to sentence within a
narrow guideline range under all but the most extraordinary enumer-
ated circumstances, the new advisory guidelines permit judges to con-
sider the unique characteristics and circumstances of both the
17. 543 U.S. 220, 245, 268 (2005) (holding that the mandatory USSG system violated the Sixth
Amendment and instructing that district courts should read the guidelines as “effectively advi-
sory” and that “reasonableness” was the standard controlling appellate review of the sentences
that district courts imposed).
18. Id. at 232.  There were two opinions for the Court in Booker: (1) Justice Stevens’ opinion
on behalf of five justices holding that a mandatory guideline system under which a defendant’s
sentence would be increased on the basis of facts not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
violated the Sixth Amendment (the “constitutional opinion”), id. at 234, and (2) Justice Breyer’s
opinion on behalf of five justices (only Justice Ginsburg joining both blocs), which held that the
remedy for the defect identified in the constitutional opinion was to sever the portion of the
SRA that made the guidelines mandatory, thus rendering them “advisory” (the “remedial” opin-
ion), id. at 244–46.
19. Id. at 245–46.
20. Id. at 245.  Prior to Booker, except when an offender cooperated with the Government
against other suspects, departures pursuant to USSG § 5K2.0 represented the primary vehicle by
which one party or another could seek relief from a guideline sentence. Id. at 234.  USSG
§ 5K2.0 permitted district courts to depart above or below a guideline sentence when the guide-
lines failed to adequately take into account an aggravating or mitigating circumstance in an indi-
vidual case.  When it rendered the guidelines advisory, the Booker Court introduced the concept
of a variance, which was a second, more discretionary way for district courts to impose sentences
outside of the guidelines. Id. at 245–46.  The touchstone for a variance is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
which authorizes courts to vary from a guideline sentence when such sentence is inconsistent
with the sentencing purposes that it sets forth.  As Justice Breyer observed in the remedial por-
tion of the Booker opinion: “Section 3553(a) . . . sets forth numerous factors that guide sentenc-
ing.  Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts . . . in determining whether a sentence is
unreasonable.” Id. at 261.
In light of their authority to grant both departures and variances, sentencing judges are now
required to engage in a multi-step, sequential sentencing process, which includes a calculation of
the applicable guideline range, the consideration of any guideline-based departures, and then
finally a consideration of any variance pursuant to § 3553(a).  While the guidelines do not neces-
sarily reflect all of the § 3553(a) factors, as a practical matter, most variances have a departure
analogue in the guidelines.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K1.1–3.1 (U.S. SEN-
TENCING COMM’N 2016).
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individual offender and offense committed.21  With this discretion
judges may adjust the severity of sentences accordingly.  At the same
time, however, to achieve the sentencing uniformity intended by Con-
gress,22 the Court authorized circuit courts to review sentences for
reasonableness.23  The Court’s failure to explain how these two con-
flicting objectives could and should be balanced (or even to acknowl-
edge the conflict) has resulted in disuniformity within and among the
circuits.  The lack of uniformity lies in, as Justice Scalia predicted in
his dissent from the Court’s remedial opinion in Booker, whether the
Sixth Amendment requires courts to approve “virtually any sentence
within the statutory range that the sentencing court imposes, so long
as the district judge goes through the appropriate formalities, such as
expressing his consideration of and disagreement with the Guidelines
sentence.”24
After Booker, the federal courts of appeal quickly split on the ap-
propriate standard of review for sentences on appeal.  In particular,
courts differed on whether an in-guideline sentence enjoyed, on re-
view, a presumption of reasonableness.25  In 2007, the Court com-
pounded rather than resolved this doctrinal confusion when it decided
Rita v. United States,26 which permitted but did not require appellate
21. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987),
with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
22. “The movement towards more determinate sentencing was pursued for the purpose of
decreasing or eliminating the judicial discretion that many believed was the primary cause of
vast sentencing disparities that were frequently based on race or class.” KENNEDY COMM’N RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 59.  “It was believed that the reduction or elimination of judicial discretion R
would result in similarly situated individuals receiving the same sentence.” Id.  In enacting the
SRA, Congress sought to achieve this noble purpose of reducing “unwarranted sentencing dis-
parities among defendants with similar records who [had] been found guilty of similar criminal
conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when war-
ranted by mitigating or aggravating factors.”  28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2012).
23. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 260–61.
24. Id. at 312 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (expressing the view that the Court’s remedial
opinion, in an attempt to rescue from nullification a statutory scheme designed to eliminate
discretionary sentencing, discarded the provisions that eliminated discretionary sentencing and
did not even pretend to honor the principle that sentencing discretion was unreviewable except
pursuant to specific statutory direction).
25. Compare United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (adopting a pre-
sumption of reasonableness), United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053–54 (10th Cir. 2006)
(per curiam), United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006), United States v.
Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006), United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir.
2006), United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Lincoln,
413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005), with United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 994 (9th Cir. 2008)
(declining to adopt a presumption of reasonableness), United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19,
27 (2d Cir. 2006), United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc),
United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3rd Cir. 2006), and United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d
784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
26. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
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courts to apply a presumption of reasonableness when reviewing in-
guideline sentences.27  According to the Rita Court, this presumption
of reasonableness was “not binding,” as it was an “appellate court pre-
sumption” that applied “only on appellate review.”28  The Court con-
cluded that a presumption of reasonableness was permissible because
in-guideline sentences reflected a coincidence of two independent and
reasoned judgments: (1) the United States Sentencing Commission
having considered the sentence in the abstract and (2) the district
judge having considered the sentence in a particular case.29  The Rita
Court did not address the standard of review that an appellate court
should apply when reviewing a sentence that varied from the applica-
ble guideline range.
The following term, the plot thickened when the Court decided the
companion cases of Gall v. United States30 and Kimbrough v. United
States.31  Together, these cases established that the Sixth Amendment
permitted but did not require district courts to vary from a particular
guideline range at sentencing when they disagreed with the policy un-
derlying it.32  In Kimbrough, the Court left open the possibility of a
substantive challenge to an in-guideline sentence and reminded dis-
trict courts of the limited role that the guidelines were supposed to
play at sentencing after Booker,33 instructing that the guidelines, “for-
27. Id. at 362–63 (holding that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
properly applied a presumption of reasonableness to Rita’s in-guideline sentence because the
presumption was not binding, did not reflect strong judicial deference, and merely recognized
that a sentencing court’s discretionary sentence that was also in accord with the advisory guide-
lines was probably reasonable).
28. Id. at 347, 351.  The sentencing court, however, does not enjoy the benefit of this presump-
tion. Id. at 351.  The Court made clear that this presumption of reasonableness was an appellate
one, which should not bear on a district court’s decision. Id.
29. See id. at 350–51 (“[T]he courts of appeals’ ‘reasonableness’ presumption, rather than hav-
ing independent legal effect, simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that when the judge’s
discretionary decision accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate application of
§ 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is reasonable.”).
30. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
31. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
32. Gall, 552 U.S. at 47 (rejecting the Government’s argument that district courts could only
sentence outside of a guideline range in an “extraordinary” case and holding that the federal
courts of appeal were required to review all federal criminal sentences under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91, 96 (holding that the 100:1 sentencing
equivalency for crack and powder cocaine was advisory, like all of the other guidelines under
Booker, and the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in considering the resulting sen-
tencing disparity in imposing a sentence below Kimbrough’s applicable guideline range).
33. Id. at 101 (“[A]s a general matter, ‘courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely
on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Brief for United States at 16, Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 85 (No. 06-6330), 2007 WL
2461473, at *16)).
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merly mandatory, now serve as one factor among several courts must
consider in determining an appropriate sentence.”34
In Gall, the Court affirmed that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) was the ulti-
mate sentencing touchstone and that the substantive reasonableness
of a sentence should be measured against its factors, noting that the
guideline range was simply the “starting point and the initial bench-
mark” for sentencing and that district courts had to consider all of the
§ 3553(a) factors to determine the appropriate sentence.35  The Gall
court established that the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
was to be reviewed for abuse of discretion, regardless of whether the
sentence was “inside, just outside, or significantly outside” of the ap-
plicable guideline range.36
In the wake of these decisions, there has been a great deal of confu-
sion and uncertainty about whether there remains any meaningful ap-
pellate review of in-guideline sentences.37  The effect of these
decisions has never been measured empirically.
The recent case of Ahmed Ressam, the “Millenium Bomber,”38 is a
good example of how this confusion stemming from Booker and sub-
sequent Supreme Court decisions play out in practice.  The judge for
34. Id. at 90.
35. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50.
36. Id. at 41.  Gall was convicted of conspiring to distribute narcotics in an enterprise from
which he had withdrawn approximately three and a half years earlier. See id. at 41–42.  His
applicable guideline range was 30–37 months imprisonment, but the district court sentenced him
to 36 months probation, finding that his sentence reflected the seriousness of the offense and
that imprisonment was unnecessary given both his voluntary withdrawal from the conspiracy and
his post-offense conduct, which included earning a college degree and starting his own successful
business. See id. at 42–43.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit reversed Gall’s sentence, holding
that a sentence outside of the guideline range had to be supported by a justification that was
“proportional to the extent of the difference between the advisory range and the sentence im-
posed.” Id. at 45 (quoting United States v. Clairborne, 439 F.3d 479, 481 (8th Cir. 2006)).  Ac-
cording to the Eighth Circuit, the sentence of probation reflected an “extraordinary” 100%
downward variance, which was justified by neither Gall’s voluntary withdrawal from the conspir-
acy nor his youth at the time of the offense. Id. Finding that the extraordinary variance was not
supported by “extraordinary circumstances,” the court reversed. Id.
The Supreme Court, finding that the Eighth Circuit had failed to give due deference to the
district court’s sentencing decision, reversed and upheld the original sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at
41.  The Court held that appellate courts could neither require that “extraordinary” circum-
stances justify a variance nor employ rigid mathematical formulas, such as the percentage of the
variance, to determine whether the sentencing court’s justifications were sufficiently compelling.
Id. at 47.  Rather, even though the size of a variance was a “relevant” consideration, courts of
appeal must review the final sentence imposed under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.
Id. at 41.
37. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Deci-
sions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2008) (noting “the confusion that the Court’s sentencing review
cases has created” since Booker).
38. United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
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the Central District of California sentenced Ressam to a 22 year term
of imprisonment for plotting to detonate explosives at Los Angeles
International Airport on December 31, 1999.39  The sentencing guide-
lines called for a sentence of approximately 65 years in prison.40  A
three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the sentence, reasoning that Ressam’s below-guide-
line sentence was substantively unreasonable because he had backed
out of an agreement to cooperative with federal investigators.41  The
panel also ordered that the district judge who had imposed the below-
guideline sentence be removed on remand.42  An en banc panel of the
Ninth Circuit, in a 7-4 vote, agreed that the sentence was substantively
unreasonable because it did not properly account for the severity of
Ressam’s crimes, which, if successful, would have killed countless peo-
ple, and the en banc panel remanded the case to the same district
judge for resentencing.43  The dissenting judges objected that the
court had overstepped its authority by overturning the sentence in-
stead of deferring to the lower court: “Our courts are well equipped to
treat each offense and offender individually, and we should not create
special sentencing rules and procedures for terrorists.”44
“Most modern theories of punishment attach considerable impor-
tance to the concept of proportionality—that more serious crimes
warrant more punitive sanctions than less serious crimes, and that
comparably serious crimes warrant comparably severe sanctions.”45
The USSG were promulgated in an effort to increase sentencing uni-
formity.46  A common criticism of the post-Booker sentencing regime
is that advisory guidelines with weak appellate review increases un-
39. See Ian Lovett, Appeals Court Overturns Millennium Bomb-Plot Sentence; Calls It Too
Light, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/us/appeals-court-over
turns-millennium-bomb-plot-sentence.html.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(Schroeder, J., dissenting)).
45. Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1751, 1752 (1999); see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 3, 9, 23–24
(1968) (arguing that a punishment system that regularly imposed disproportionate punishments
would defy conventional morality, create a sense of public insecurity, and lose credibility); AN-
DREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 6, 15–19 (1993) (arguing that proportionality is a
central feature of any system of punishment); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT
11, 26–27 (1974) (arguing that proportionality is one valid concern among many and sets outer
limits on morally justifiable punishments).
46. See supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text. R
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warranted sentencing disparities.47 Gall has emboldened some district
courts to exercise greater discretion, while others remain highly guide-
line bound.  This is at least in part because of the “safe harbor” that a
guideline sentence can give on appeal.  Justice Souter, in his dissenting
opinion in Rita, expressed his concern with the “gravitational pull” of
the guidelines and the extent to which it could be strengthened by a
presumption of reasonableness:
What works on appeal determines what works at trial, and if the
Sentencing Commission’s views are as weighty as the Court says
they are, a trial judge will find it far easier to make the appropriate
findings and sentence within the appropriate Guideline, than to go
through the unorthodox factfinding necessary to justify a sentence
outside the Guidelines range.48
In addition, as other commentators have noted, there is a tension be-
tween sentencing discretion at the district court level and substantive-
reasonableness-review discretion at the circuit court level that is un-
resolved, and this Article contends that it remains wholly unresolvable
under the Supreme Court’s current Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.49
All of this doctrinal uncertainty has resulted in a division among
federal circuit courts of appeal as to the proper allocation of discretion
between trial and appellate courts.  Some circuits vest an inordinate
amount of discretion at the district court level, which is unreviewable
in practice.  At the other end of the spectrum, some circuits vest much
more discretion at the appellate level.  Circuits that retain appellate-
level discretion do so in two different ways: Either they retain discre-
tion to require district courts to vary from guideline sentences con-
cerning those crimes for which they believe the guidelines to be
flawed, or they retain discretion to set a high threshold for affirming
47. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENC-
ING PRACTICES: AN UPDATE OF THE BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
15 (2010); see also Douglas A. Berman, Exploring the Theory, Policy, and Practice of Fixing the
Broken Sentencing Guidelines, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 182, 182 (2009) (criticizing the guidelines’
reliance on drug quantity and monetary loss as proxies for culpability); Ryan W. Scott, The
Effects of Booker on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 104, 104 (2009).
48. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 390–91 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
49. The Court’s two objectives in Booker, requiring district court discretion and cabining that
discretion through reasonableness review, are in tension with each other. “[A]ppellate review, by
its nature, tends to restrict the discretion of district courts in future cases and, therefore, threat-
ens to undermine the district court discretion necessary to Booker’s remedy.”  Hessick & Hes-
sick, supra note 37, at 3.  As a result, the Court has, in subsequent cases, sacrificed the central R
functions of appellate review: error correction and lawmaking.  It has undermined the error-
correction function by permitting appellate courts to presume that within-guideline sentences
are reasonable, and it has impaired the lawmaking function by directing appellate courts to defer
to district courts’ sentencing policy determinations.
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sentencing variances and implicitly require district courts to impose
in-guideline sentences in all but the most extraordinary cases.  The
result is a patchwork of guideline sentencing in which defendants’
sentences are dictated more by the happenstance of geography than
by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
The United States Courts of Appeal for the First, Third, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits exemplify the latter.  One example of the high
threshold approach taken by these circuits is United States v.
D’Amico.50  D’Amico was a city councilor convicted of extortion and
false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 1001, respec-
tively.51  His applicable guideline range was 31–44 months imprison-
ment, but the district court varied downward and sentenced him to 4
months imprisonment.52  The variance was granted based on, among
other things, the collateral consequences of D’Amico’s conviction,
which would likely preclude his ability to engage in professional work,
and his prior good works as a legislator.53  On appeal, the First Circuit
vacated D’Amico’s sentence, finding that the district court’s reasons
for the variance were insufficient.54  The First Circuit noted that the
variance resulted in a sentence 88% below D’Amico’s guideline
range.55  Although the court did not disagree with the district court’s
finding that D’Amico had performed prior good works as a public
servant, it concluded that the sentencing court had “overvalued these
contributions in imposing [D’Amico’s] sentence” and had erred in
considering the collateral consequences as a justification for a substan-
tial variance.56
A second example is United States v. Tomko.57  Tomko was the
owner and president of a construction company.58  In the late 1990s,
Tomko built a luxurious new home for himself and instructed the sub-
contractors to bill the expenses to his company, rather than to him
personally.59  The company then took illegal tax deductions on the
costs of the new home as business expenses, permitting Tomko to
evade taxes of more than $200,000, for which Tomko pled guilty to tax
evasion.60  The parties agreed, as part of the plea agreement, that
50. 496 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2007).
51. Id. at 98.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 105–06.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 106.
56. D’Amico, 496 F.3d at 107.
57. United States v. Tomko, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007).
58. Id. at 159
59. Id.
60. Id. at 159–60.
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Tomko’s guideline range for sentencing was 12–18 months imprison-
ment, but the district court varied downward and sentenced Tomko to
a sentence of community service, a fine, and probation with a period
of home detention.61  The Third Circuit vacated Tomko’s sentence,
disagreeing with the district court’s analysis of the sentencing factors
that justified a variance and the weight of the evidence.62  The Third
Circuit held the sentence was substantively (as opposed to procedur-
ally) unreasonable because it was inconsistent with the goals of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).63
A third example is United States v. Carlson.64  Carlson was con-
victed of willfully failing to account for and pay taxes on trust funds in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7202.65  His applicable guideline range was
18–24 months imprisonment.66  The district court sentenced him to 8
months home confinement, probation, and community service.67  The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the variance because:
Carlson (1) ha[d] a significant record of charitable activities; (2) ac-
cepted responsibility and made an exceptional effort to repay [the
taxes that he owed]; (3) suffered damage to his business, reputation,
and family relationships; and (4) was not motivated by a desire to
defraud the government, but was instead attempting to resolve a
financial crisis within his business.68
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated Carlson’s sentence.69  The court
noted that the variance amounted to a 100% reduction below Carl-
son’s guideline range, noting: “‘We have suggested that a variance to
zero prison time where the Sentencing Commission has found that
substantial prison time is indicated requires extraordinary justifica-
tion,’ and ‘have routinely rejected this kind of variance as unreasona-
ble.’”70  The court held that the specific basis for the district court’s
downward variance did not justify its extraordinary nature.71
The decision in Gall, on its face, would seem to foreclose the type of
review employed by circuit courts in this latter category.  Nonetheless,
below-guideline sentences that have been imposed in these circuits
61. Id. at 161–62.
62. Id. at 172.
63. Tomko, 498 F.3d at 172.
64. United States v. Carlson, 498 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2007).
65. Id. at 762.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 763.
69. Id. at 762.
70. Carlson, 498 F.3d at 764 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Soperla, 494 F.3d
752, 755 (8th Cir. 2007)).
71. Id. at 765–66.
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since Rita have been reversed on appeal as unreasonable.  In addition,
deference to district courts that impose sentences with which the cir-
cuit courts disagree, has not been as strong as the Booker and Rita
decisions suggested.  The review in these cases often more closely re-
sembles de novo than abuse of discretion.
A final example is United States v. Pugh, which was decided after
Gall.72  The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the imposition of a sentence of
probation after Pugh’s conviction for knowingly possessing child por-
nography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).73  Pugh’s appli-
cable guideline range was 97–120 months, and the district court varied
substantially downward to impose a sentence of probation.74  The dis-
trict court held sentencing hearings over two days, heard from numer-
ous witnesses, and “deliberated extensively over its sentencing
decision.”75  The Eleventh Circuit nonetheless reversed, finding
Pugh’s sentence to be substantively unreasonable.76  While the appel-
late court described its review in deferential terms, its substantive dis-
agreement with the district court’s sentencing analysis was about how
to weigh sentencing factors in a particular case.77
This Article should not be read as criticizing judicial discretion glob-
ally or advocating a return to the mandatory guideline system that the
Court struck down in Booker.  Historically, the USSG have worked to
the detriment of criminal defendants generally, tending to increase
their sentences and resulting in arbitrary and unequal justice.78  While
guidelines may help sentencing courts impose fair and equitable
sentences, judicial discretion is necessary to assure that sentences re-
flect the totality of circumstances regarding an offender and offense.
A key requirement for achieving justice is giving judges sufficient dis-
cretion to recognize legitimate differences among offenders charged
with similar offenses and consider the totality of circumstances in de-
ciding that a sentence in a specific case is “just.”  No set of rules, in-
cluding the USSG, can substitute for this necessary flexibility.  After
all, a system would be perfectly “uniform” if every offender were sen-
tenced to 10 years imprisonment upon conviction for any offense, but
no one would describe such system as just or fair because a fair system
also requires equality.
72. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008).
73. Id. at 1182.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1192.
76. Id. at 1194.
77. See id.
78. See KENNEDY COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 16–17. R
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There has never been much, if any, evidence to support the view
that sentencing disparity was eliminated by the mandatory guide-
lines.79  On the contrary, mandatory guidelines tend to mask arbitrary
disparities under the guise of methodological calculations.  Mandatory
guidelines fail to account for the individual when determining the ap-
propriate punishment.  From the outset, many academics criticized the
guidelines as unfairly requiring consideration of “relevant uncharged
conduct,” limiting consideration of relevant offender characteristics,
and replacing judges’ sentencing discretion with a rigid mathematical
formula.80
The result was inappropriate uniformity for vastly different defend-
ants and circumstances due to emphasis on a single commonality, typi-
cally the charging statute, drug quantity, or loss amount.  “What
proponents of determinate sentencing did not fully realize was that
the elimination of judicial discretion at the sentencing stage would not
eliminate disparities as long as police and prosecutors continued to
exercise discretion at the arrest, charging, and plea bargaining stages
of the process.”81
79. See Frank O. Bowman III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in
Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679, 716 (1996) (“The
somewhat troubling truth is that the actual evidence on the question of the Guidelines’ effect on
disparity is scant.”); A. Abigail Payne, Does Inter-Judge Disparity Really Matter? An Analysis of
the Effects of Sentencing Reforms in Three Federal District Courts, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
337, 338 (1997) (finding that the effect of the uniform Guidelines on the variability in sentencing
was negligible); cf. David Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse of Federal Guideline
Sentencing, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 881, 912 (1996) (“Guidelines are premised on a mistaken notion
that the largest problem in federal sentencing is disparity in the sentences judicially imposed on
different defendants, not in erecting a system that is rational and just.”). But see James M. An-
derson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 294–95 (1999) (finding a decrease in inter-judge sentencing
disparity after the enactment of the federal guidelines); Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 239, 241 (1994) (finding “the sentencing guidelines have had modest but meaningful success
at reducing unwarranted disparity among judges in the sentences imposed on similar crimes and
offenders”).
80. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 339,
341 (1991); see also Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1684–85 (1992); Marc L. Miller,
Domination and Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1236–37
(2004) (noting the various criticisms levied at the sentencing guidelines after their promulga-
tion); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin’ Heart(land): The Long Search for
Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723, 723–24 (1999).
81. KENNEDY COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 109. R
“[T]he elimination of judicial discretion [through determinate sentencing guidelines]
strengthened the impact of the decisions made by these officials, especially the prosecu-
tor.  Judicial discretion had operated as a check on the unbridled, discretionary deci-
sions of prosecutors, who were not otherwise accountable for their decisions.  With the
removal of judicial discretion and the introduction of the sentencing guidelines and
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL109.txt unknown Seq: 15 10-APR-17 11:07
2016] DE FACTO MANDATORY 65
A new study has “found vast disparities in the prison sentences
handed down by [district] judges presiding over similar cases.”82  This
study by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at
Syracuse University analyzed the sentences imposed by 885 federal
district judges in more than 370,000 criminal cases between the years
2007–2011 has discovered extensive variations in the sentencing prac-
tices of district judges in different districts.83  Because the report ex-
amined differences in sentencing practices within individual districts
where judges presumably received the same general mix of cases, this
finding raises questions about the extent to which sentences in some
districts are influenced by the particular judge rather than the facts of
the specific case.84
Geography is a fact neither pled nor proven to a jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.  When a difference in geography results in a compara-
tively longer sentence for some defendants than for other similarly (or
even less-favorably) situated defendants in other districts, this lack of
uniformity violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.  Equality and the rule of law dictate that an of-
fender’s sentence should not depend upon which judge happens to be
assigned to the case.  While myriad other commentators have offered
a doctrinal and/or normative angle as to this disuniformity, this Article
seeks instead to approach it from a descriptive and empirical perspec-
tive by quantifying the disuniformity.85
Part III describes the methodology used in this survey of federal
appellate court cases decided after Booker challenging the substantive
mandatory minimums [Congress and the USSC] essentially empowered prosecutors to
predetermine the sentence through their charging and plea-bargaining decisions.”
Id.
82. Mosi Secret, Wide Sentencing Disparity Found Among U.S. Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/nyregion/wide-sentencing-disparity-found-among-us-
judges.html.
83. Id. The study covered each sentence imposed by federal district court judges over the past
five years. Id. See Surprising Judge-to-Judge Variations Documented in Federal Sentencing,
TRAC REP., http://trac.syr.edu/tracereports/judge/274 (last visited Aug. 19, 2016); see, e.g., U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT tbl. 2 (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentenc
ing-updates/USSC_2010_Quarter_Report_Final.pdf (noting that, within the First Circuit, in-
guideline sentences in the District of Massachusetts represented only 32.1% of the total cases,
while in the District of Puerto Rico, in-guideline sentences represented 73% of cases).
84. See Secret, supra note 82.  Ryan Scott reached a similar conclusion in his study of the R
Massachusetts federal courts. See generally Scott, supra note 47 (finding that sentencing dispari- R
ties have increased and the effect of the individual judge has doubled since Booker).
85. There is no comparable data set for sentencing decisions that neither party has appealed
from the district court to a court of appeals.  Such decisions are typically not reported, and many
defendants waive their right to appeal a court’s sentencing decision as part of a plea bargain.
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reasonableness of sentences imposed by the district court.86  Part IV
presents the results of the survey.87  The data suggest that the enor-
mous discretion currently given to judges has resulted in substantial
geographic disparity in (1) application of the guidelines, district to dis-
trict and circuit to circuit, and (2) the distribution of discretion be-
tween district courts and appellate courts among the circuits.  Part V
offers an interpretation of these results and some concluding
thoughts.88
III. METHODOLOGY: THE METHOD TO THE MADNESS
A. Project Design
This project collected, collated, and coded all of the post-Gall/Kim-
brough substantive-reasonableness appeals, published and unpub-
lished decisions issued89 between 2008–2011, sorted by outcome and
circuit.  Only cases in which the appellate court ruled on the merits of
a party’s substantive-reasonableness challenge were included in the
data set; cases in which a party challenged the substantive reasonable-
ness of a sentence but the sentence was reversed on other grounds
(e.g., procedural errors in the sentencing),90 without the court reach-
ing the question of the substantive reasonableness of the sentence im-
posed, were not considered.  The results of reasonableness review
were separated into four categories: (1) in-guideline sentences that
were affirmed; (2) in-guideline sentences that were reversed; (3) sen-
tencing variances that were affirmed; and (4) sentencing variances
that were reversed.  The study then compared the results of substan-
tive reasonableness review across the twelve circuits.
86. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. R
87. See supra notes 95–175 and accompanying text. R
88. See supra notes 176–185 and accompanying text. R
89. This was accomplished in three steps: (1) by Shephardizing Booker by circuit; (2) by nar-
rowing the results by date to include only those appeals decided after the Supreme Court issued
its opinions in Gall and Kimbrough; and (3) reading the resulting cache of opinions and filtering
out those that did not involve a review of the substantive reasonableness of the defendant’s
sentence.  This methodology was selected on the assumption that, while not every case citing
Booker would involve reasonableness review, presumably almost every, if not every, case that
involved reasonableness review would cite Booker.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 239, 247–49 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that
the district court erred in treating crack cocaine sentencing differential incorporated in the
guidelines as mandatory as opposed to discretionary); United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103,
119–20 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that remand is warranted when sentencing judge commits a pro-
cedural error in imposing a sentence, affording the judge an opportunity to determine whether
the original sentence would have been nontrivially different post-Booker).
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B. Terminology & Sample
In its remedial opinion in Booker, the Court read a “reasonable-
ness” standard of review into the SRA.91  This project analyzed only
appeals of a sentence’s substantive, as opposed to procedural,
reasonableness.
“Variance,” for the purpose of this study, refers to any sentence
outside of the applicable guideline range, either above or below.  The
study did not distinguish between formal departures under the guide-
lines and true Booker/§ 3553(a) variances.92  In other words, if the de-
fendant’s sentence was outside of the applicable guideline range, it
was a variance.  This decision was made despite the fact that, strictly
speaking, a presumption of reasonableness should mean that a depar-
ture under the guideline manual is presumptively reasonable, whereas
a Booker variance is not.  This decision was made for two reasons.
The first was a practical one; while Booker requires lower courts to
distinguish guideline-based departures from § 3553-based variances as
part of procedural reasonableness, appellate-court opinions do not al-
ways indicate which was imposed, particularly if the appeal only in-
volves a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
The second was a statistical assumption that with a large enough sam-
ple, any difference in how appellate courts treat a traditional depar-
ture versus a new variance would not skew the results in the
aggregate.  As a practical matter, the study found no departures
outside of the guideline range that were explicitly described as guide-
line-based departures, but rather, all appeared to have been true vari-
ances, probably in light of the more deferential standard of review
that variances receive post-Booker.
A “case,” for the purpose of this study, is defined per defendant.
For example, if three co-defendants in a drug case were sentenced
within the guidelines, appealed their sentences for substantive reason-
ableness in a consolidated appeal, and if the circuit court had affirmed
their sentences, the study would count the result as an affirmation of
three in-guideline sentences.
The study did not include in its data set appeals of sentences that
were driven by mandatory minimum sentences that exceeded the oth-
erwise applicable guideline range, even when a defendant attempted
to appeal those mandatory sentences on the ground that they were
substantively unreasonable or violated the parsimony principle of
§ 3553(a).  It also did not include government appeals of sentences
91. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005)
92. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. R
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that were imposed below a statutory mandatory minimum, whether
within the applicable guideline range or not.
The study did not control for child pornography offenses, even
though two federal circuits have essentially found the child pornogra-
phy guidelines to be per se unreasonable.93  The number of child por-
nography cases in the data set was relatively small, and the study
makes the assumption that the federal circuits that do not apply a pre-
sumption of reasonableness to the child pornography guidelines likely
do not apply a presumption of reasonableness to the guidelines gener-
ally; therefore, the circuits’ caselaw regarding child pornography
sentences would not be expected to skew the results.
IV. RESULTS & ANALYSIS: THE MADNESS IN THE METHOD94
As Justice Scalia predicted in his dissent from the Court’s remedial
opinion in Booker, the majority opinion has “produce[d] a discordant
symphony of different standards, varying from court to court and
judge to judge.”95  Striking sentencing disparities jump out at first
glance.  In some districts and circuits, judges regularly depart from the
guideline sentencing range for whole categories of crimes—for exam-
ple, in cases involving possession and receipt of child pornography and
certain types of fraud;96 in other districts and circuits, judges generally
impose in-guideline sentences only.97  The results are sometimes dras-
tically inconsistent across cases and among similarly situated defend-
ants, and it raises questions about the extent to which the goal of
93. See United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 598 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Dorvee, 616
F.3d 174, 186–87 (2d Cir. 2010).
94. All data is on file with the author.
95. Booker, 543 U.S. at 312 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
96. This is, perhaps, not surprising given that the guidelines for both types of offenses have
been widely criticized for significant recent increases to guideline sentences with no basis in
empirical data, but rather in response to a series of ill-considered congressional directives passed
at the urging of law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108–10
(1990) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the criminalization of mere possession of child
pornography on the ground that the demand for child pornography encouraged its production,
which necessarily involved the physical sexual abuse of children). But see Michael C. Seto et al.,
Contact Sexual Offending by Men with Online Sexual Offenses, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE J. RES. &
TREATMENT 124, 128–31, 140 (2011) (performing a meta-analysis of 33 studies that looked at the
criminal histories and recidivism rates of child pornography offenders and concluding that child
pornography offenders were relatively unlikely to commit sexual offenses involving physical con-
tact with a child).  In a 2010 survey by the USSC, approximately 70% of federal judges said that
the recommended penalties for possessing or receiving child pornography were unreasonable.
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES: JANUARY
2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbls. 1 & 8 (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/re-
search-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Duarte, 569 F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 2009).
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equal justice under the law is served by the Court’s sentencing
jurisprudence.
A. Reversal Data
The results of this survey are as follows.  The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed 22 in-guideline sentences, re-
versed 1 in-guideline sentence, affirmed 10 variances, and reversed
zero variances.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed 53 in-guideline sentences, reversed 1 in-guideline sen-
tence, affirmed 33 variances, and reversed 7 variances.  The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed 71 in-guideline
sentences, reversed zero in-guideline sentences, affirmed 25 variances,
and reversed 11 variances.  The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed 73 in-guideline sentences,98 reversed 5 in-
guideline sentences,99 affirmed 41 variances,100 and reversed 8 vari-
ances.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
viewed 172 sentences for reasonableness post-Booker, 93 in-guideline
and 79 variances, and affirmed all but 2 of those sentences, reversing 2
in-guideline sentences in a single case (involving two co-defendants).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed 74
in-guideline sentences, reversed 5 in-guideline sentences, affirmed 38
variances, and reversed 7 variances.  The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed 21 in-guideline sentences,101 re-
versed 1 in-guideline sentence, affirmed 13 variances,102 and reversed
5 variances.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed 29 in-guideline sentences, reversed zero in-guideline
sentences, affirmed 22 variances, and reversed 5 variances.  The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 28 in-
guideline sentences, reversed 6 in-guideline sentences, affirmed 16
variances, and reversed 2 variances.  The United States Court of Ap-
98. This number includes 19 appeals in which the defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (requiring that a court-appointed-
appellate attorney who finds a defendant’s appeal to be wholly frivolous to advise the court and
supply a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal).
99. This includes 1 appeal in which the defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Anders.
100. This includes 4 appeals in which the defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant
to Anders.
101. This includes 2 appeals in which the defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant
to Anders.
102. This includes 1 appeal in which the defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Anders.
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peals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed 53 in-guideline sentences,103 re-
versed 1 in-guideline sentence, affirmed 22 variances, and reversed 3
variances.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed 157 in-guideline sentences, reversed 1 in-guideline sen-
tence, affirmed 71 variances, and reversed 5 variances.  The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
5 in-guideline sentences, reversed zero in-guideline sentences, af-
firmed 3 variances, and reversed 2 variances.104
B. Interpretation of Reversal Data
The introduction to this Article divided the federal circuits into
three categories based on their style of post-Booker review: (1) those
that show a great deal of deference to district court sentences; (2)
those that exercise a great deal of discretion at the appellate level,
reversing relatively high percentages of district court sentences, but
doing so with little regard to whether such sentences are within or
outside the applicable guideline range and, in some instances, even
requiring district courts to vary from guideline sentences when sen-
tencing defendants for crimes for which they believe the guidelines to
be flawed; and (3) those that continue to show a great deal of defer-
ence to the guidelines, requiring district courts to impose in-guideline
sentences in all but the most extraordinary cases by setting a high
threshold for sentencing variances to be affirmed on appeal.  These
categories are somewhat fluid (requiring a subjective decision as to
what constitute relatively “high” and “low” rates of reversals), but the
statistical disparities between both overall reversal rates and relative
reversal rates as well as between in-guideline sentences and variances
are so large that they warrant systematic analysis.
103. This includes 4 appeals in which the defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant
to Anders.
104. There were clearly significant variations in the number of appeals of sentences based on
claims of substantive reasonableness, which do not correlate with the size of caseload of the
respective circuit involved.  For example, the Ninth Circuit is the largest circuit in the country, by
geography, population, and caseload, see U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 2015 NINTH
CIRCUIT ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2015), but it has only reviewed 50 sentences for substantive rea-
sonableness during the course of the study, fewer total sentences than variances reviewed by the
Eleventh Circuit during the same time frame.  The possible causes of this seeming disparity (e.g.,
rates of appeal waivers, rates of appellate reversal within the circuits, rates of below-guidelines
sentences imposed in the districts within the circuits, or the level of deference that a circuit
shows either the guidelines or district courts on appeal) are interesting but beyond the subject
matter of this study.
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1. Deference to District Court
The First, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits demonstrated ex-
traordinary deference to district court sentences in their post-Booker
reasonableness review with little difference between their treatment
of in-guideline sentences and variances on appeal.  This is best demon-
strated by looking at the comparative percentages of affirmances and
reversals, rather than the raw numbers.  The First Circuit affirmed
97% of a total of 33 sentences on reasonableness review, affirming 22
in-guideline sentences and 10 variances, while reversing only 1 in-
guideline sentence.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed approximately 99% of
the sentences that it reviewed.  The only 2 sentences that it reversed
were within the applicable guideline range.
The results for the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits were less stark, but
nonetheless warrant their placement in this category, with approxi-
mately 95% and 96% affirmance rates, respectively.  Each court was
slightly more likely to reverse a variance than an in-guideline sen-
tence, but not by a large enough margin to classify them as courts that
showed significant deference to the guidelines. The Tenth Circuit re-
versed in-guideline sentences approximately 2% of the time and vari-
ances approximately 12%; the Eleventh Circuit reversed in-guideline
and variance sentences at similar rates 1% and 11%, respectively, but
both circuits’ overall reversal rates (both less than 5%) were so low as
to render the differences between the percentages for those two sub-
types of reversals insignificant.
2. Significant Discretion Within Appellate Court
The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits belong in an opposing cate-
gory, showing significantly less deference to district court sentences on
appeal and more willingness to reverse sentences that they found to
be substantively unreasonable.  In percentage terms, the Sixth Circuit
reversed just less than 10% of the sentences that it reviewed for sub-
stantive reasonableness, reversing approximately 6% of in-guideline
sentences and 16% of variances.  The Seventh Circuit reversed ap-
proximately 15% of all challenged sentences, approximately 5% of in-
guideline sentences and approximately 26% of variances.  The Ninth
Circuit reversed approximately 14% of the challenged sentences, re-
versing approximately 17% of in-guideline sentences and 16% of
variances.105
105. These findings are consistent with prior findings that the Seventh and Ninth Circuit’s
review of guideline departures, under the formerly mandatory guideline scheme pre-Booker,
were anomalous and “aggressive.” See Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal
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3. Deference to Guidelines
The Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits all showed
significantly more deference to guideline sentences than to variances,
with overall reversal rates that were relatively high, but almost en-
tirely due to their high rates of variance reversal.  While there were no
circuits that showed a pre-Booker level of deference to the guide-
lines—because all circuits either affirmed at least one district court
variances or reversed at least one district court in-guideline sentence,
which presumably would have been disallowed or at least much less
likely under the old-mandatory-guideline regime—the D.C. Circuit
came the closest to matching this description.  The D.C. Circuit re-
versed 20% of all challenged sentences, but reversed zero in-guideline
sentences, reversing approximately 68% of variances.
The Second Circuit reversed approximately 9% of the 94 sentences
that it reviewed, but, of the 9%, only one was an in-guideline sen-
tence, resulting in a relative reversal rate of less than 2% for in-guide-
line sentences and more than 18% for variances.
The Third Circuit similarly reversed fewer than 10% of all chal-
lenged sentences, but none of its reversals were of in-guideline
sentences.  Its relative reversal rates of in-guideline and variance
sentences were 0% and more than 25%, respectively.
The Fourth Circuit reversed approximately 9% of the sentences that
it reviewed, but it reversed variances at twice the rate than in-guide-
line sentences, reversing in-guideline sentences approximately 6% of
the time and variances approximately 12% of the time.106
The Eighth Circuit reversed approximately 9% of all challenged
sentences, but reversed zero in-guideline sentences while reversing ap-
proximately 19% of variances.
These circuits that show considerable deference to the district
courts (largely affirming all sentences whether within the guideline
range or outside) are probably the most concerning, from a constitu-
tional point of view, because the guidelines appear to have a presump-
Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 337–38
(1996) (finding that “the Seventh Circuit’s departure review tended to be somewhat more ag-
gressive than that of the other courts” and that “[t]he Ninth Circuit was also notable in its depar-
ture review standards, as the court imposed rather stringent procedural requirements on district
courts’ decisions to depart”).
106. If one considers only the reasonableness appeals in which no party filed an Anders brief
on the assumption that an Anders brief is an indication that an appeal is frivolous, a difficult
assumption in at least the 4 Anders appeals involving sentencing variances and the 1 Anders
appeal involving the in-guideline sentence that was reversed, the Fourth Circuit reversed approx-
imately (10% of the challenged sentences, reversing approximately 8% of challenged in-guide-
line sentences and 13% of challenged variances.
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tion of reasonableness so strong in them that they remain de facto
mandatory.107
4. Commonalities
There are several trends that emerge from this reversal data com-
mon to almost all of the federal circuits.  In all 12 of the circuits, the
majority of district court sentences were affirmed on appeal.  In all of
the circuits except for the D.C. Circuit, the appeals court affirmed a
majority of variances, as well.  In all of the circuits except for the
Ninth Circuit,108 the appellate courts reversed variances by a signifi-
cantly higher percentage than they reversed in-guideline sentences.  In
every circuit, a majority of the appealed sentences were within the
applicable guideline range.  Of the 1,120 cases comprising the data set
of the study, 674 of the challenged sentences, 60% were in-guideline
sentences.  Of those guideline sentences, the circuit courts collectively
reversed approximately 0.5%.
One of the fascinating aspects of the study results is that the level of
deference that the federal circuits show to in-guideline sentences in
practice bears no apparent relationship to whether they have adopted
a presumption of guideline reasonableness as a doctrinal matter.  For
example, of the 5 circuits that show the most deference to in-guideline
sentences, only three (the Fourth,109 Eighth,110 and D.C.111 Circuits)
have adopted this presumption.  The Second112 and Third113 Circuits
have explicitly rejected the presumption of guideline reasonableness,
but nonetheless together reversed only 1 in-guideline sentences out of
a total of 124 guideline sentences reviewed (i.e., fewer than 1%).114
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit purports to apply a presumption of rea-
sonableness for guideline sentences,115 but, in the entire data set of
107. See infra Part III.E.
108. The Ninth Circuit reversed in-guideline sentences and variances at roughly equal rates,
17% and 16% of the time, respectively.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346 (2007) (declining to establish a presumption that a Guidelines
sentence is reasonable).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331–32 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated by Rita,
551 U.S. at 346.
114. In addition to rejecting a presumption of reasonableness for in-guideline sentences, the
Second and Third Circuits are the two federal circuits that have held that the child pornography
guidelines are presumptively unreasonable. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. R
115. See, e.g., United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006).
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this study, reversed only a single sentence that it reviewed for reason-
ableness, and that sentence was within the applicable guideline range.
What emerges from these commonalities is the following, perhaps
unsurprising, generality about post-Booker sentencing in federal
courts.  District courts imposing in-guideline sentences are almost cer-
tain to be affirmed on appeal, even in circuits that retain to themselves
a great deal of appellate discretion and do not apply a presumption of
reasonableness for in-guideline sentences.116  Variances are also far
more likely than not (but not as likely as in-guideline sentences) to be
affirmed.117  The result of these two cardinal principles is that the
combination of deference to the district courts and deference to the
guidelines creates a near-total safe harbor on appeal for district courts
that sentence within the guidelines.
C. Direction of Variance118
1. Little to No Effect
The First and Fifth Circuits affirmed all variances that they re-
viewed.  The First Circuit affirmed 5 upward and 5 downward vari-
ances, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed 69 upward and 10 downward
variances.119
116. See supra Part IV.A (discussing results of the survey of post-Booker review of sentences
for reasonableness, by district).
117. See supra Part IV.B.2.
118. The direction of variances was not always ascertainable from the appellate opinion.  The
results reported in this section of the study are based solely on those opinions in which the
direction of the variance is indicated.  The results reported in Sections III.C–F do not include
downward variances that were appealed by defendants as insufficient, since, in the absence of a
cross-appeal by the government, the court could not reverse the variance in favor of an in-
guideline sentence. See, e.g., Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 240 (2008) (holding that
appellate courts could not increase defendants’ sentences that they challenged on appeal in the
absence of a government cross-appeal); United States v. Huff, No. 09-5021, 2010 WL 3010762, at
*1 (4th Cir. July 28, 2010) (appealing the reasonableness of a below-guideline sentence of fifteen
months imprisonment) (per curiam); United States v. Sellers, Nos. 09-4332, 09-4335, 2010 WL
2340252, at *1 (4th Cir. June 10, 2010) (appeal, inter alia, of the reasonableness of a below-
guideline sentence of 144 months imprisonment); United States v. Wilson, No. 08-4789, 2009 WL
1262401, at *1 (4th Cir. May 8, 2009) (appeal of the reasonableness of a below-guideline
sentence of 320 months imprisonment) (per curiam).
119. Two Fifth Circuit cases involving review of downward variances have been omitted from
these results (analyzing the effect of the direction of a variance on the court’s substantive reason-
ableness review) because of their anomalous circumstances.  In the first case, the defendant was
found guilty of 13 violations of supervised release. See United States v. Calhoun, No. 07-51349,
2008 WL 3821315, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008).  His resulting sentencing-guideline range was
4–10 months imprisonment on each count. Id.  The trial court sentenced the defendant to 2.3
months imprisonment on each count, but ran the thirteen sentences consecutively. See id.  While
the individual sentences were technically downward variances, the defendant was appealing the
consecutive nature of the imposition of the sentences, which resulted in a total sentence (30
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The Sixth Circuit reversed 2 out of 21 upward variances and 3 out of
24 downward variances that it reviewed, for relative reversal rates of
approximately 10% and 13%.
The Eighth Circuit reversed a significant percentage of the vari-
ances that it reviewed, but the direction of the variance did not play a
significant role.  The court reversed approximately 19% of the down-
ward variances (4 out of 21) and 17% of the upward variances (1 out
of 6) that it reviewed.
The Ninth Circuit only reversed 1 upward variance, out of 5 total
that it reviewed, and 1 downward variance, out of 13 total that it re-
viewed.120  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit reversed 2 out of 16 upward
variances and 1 out of 9 downward variances, for relative reversal
rates of approximately 13% and 11%, respectively.121
The D.C. Circuit only reviewed 5 total variances: 3 downward and 2
upward.  To the extent that any meaningful information can be
gleaned from such a small data set, it does not appear that the direc-
tion of the variance affected the likely result.  The court affirmed 2
downward and 1 upward variance and reversed 1 upward and down-
ward variances each.
2. Preference for Upward Variances
Several circuits were significantly more likely to reverse a down-
ward variance than an upward variance.  While the downward vari-
ances (26) reviewed by the Second Circuit outnumbered the upward
variances (12) by more than two to one,122 all 7 of the variances that
months significantly above the high end of the guideline range for the individual counts 10
months), had the sentences been run concurrently. Id.
In the second case, the defendant was found guilty of multiple offenses, some which carried
consecutive mandatory-minimum sentences. See United States v. Harper, 527 F.3d 396, 399–400
(5th Cir. 2008).  The trial court imposed the mandatory sentences, plus a consecutive 10-month
sentence on the remaining counts, which was significantly below the applicable 63–79 month
guideline range for those counts. Id. at 411.  Harper appealed, arguing that the total sentence
(370 months) was unreasonable; however, because the court only had the discretion to sentence
him to a more lenient sentence on the counts that did not carry mandatory-minimum sentences,
he was, in essence, appealing a downward departure from 63–10 months as insufficiently below
the applicable guideline range. Id.
120. While statistically this creates a significant variation in the percentage of upward (8%)
and downward (17%) variances that the court reversed, one of each category did not seem to be
a large enough sample from which to conclude that the direction of the variance played a role in
the outcome of the court’s review.
121. Similar to the results for the Ninth Circuit, the total number of variances that the Tenth
Circuit reviewed and reversed is too small to extrapolate anything from these relative reversal
rates.
122. It was impossible to tell the direction of the other 2 of the 40 total variances that the
Second Circuit reviewed.
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the Second Circuit reversed were downward variances.  The result is
that the Second Circuit reversed 27% of downward variances, com-
pared with 0% upward variances.
The Third Circuit reviewed 36 variances, 25 of which were down-
ward variances and 11 of which were upward variances.  Of the 11
variances that the court reversed on appeal, 10 were downward vari-
ances.  The result is that the Third Circuit reversed downward vari-
ances (40% of the time) at a rate of more than four times upward
variances (9%).
The Fourth Circuit reviewed 49 total variances, 26 of which were
upward variances and 19 of which were downward variances.123  The
court reversed downward variances at almost 3 times the rate of up-
ward variances, reversing approximately 10% of upward variances
and 28% of downward variances.  These results likely significantly un-
derstate the relative disparity between the Fourth Circuit’s reversal of
upward and downward variances, because the majority of the affirmed
downward variances in the data set were appeals in which the defen-
dant was challenging a downward variance as insufficiently below the
guidelines.124
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed upward variances at a rate of almost
10 times that at which it affirmed downward variances, affirming all
but 1 of the 41 upward variances that it reviewed, a relative reversal
rate of approximately 2% and reversing 7 of the 34 downward vari-
ances that it reviewed,125 a relative reversal rate of approximately
21%.126
123. It was impossible to ascertain the direction of 3 of the variances that the Fourth Circuit
reviewed.  In addition, one appellate case reviewing an upward variance has been left out of this
section of the data set for this Article because the upward variance in question was imposed
pursuant to a plea agreement in which the defendant agreed to an upward variance in exchange
for a charge bargain, which dismissed more serious charges that would have resulted in a guide-
line range higher than the upward variance on the charges to which the defendant pleaded
guilty. See United States v. Brown, No. 09-4122, 2009 WL 2843578, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 2009)
(per curiam).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Huff, No. 09-5021, 2010 WL 3010762, at *3 (4th Cir. July 28,
2010) (per curiam); United States v. Sellers, Nos. 09-4332, 09-4335, 2010 WL 2340252, at *3 (4th
Cir. June 10, 2010) (per curiam); United States v. Peribian-Gonzales, No. 07-4460, 2009 WL
4049150, at *1–2 (4th Cir. Nov. 24, 2009) (per curiam); United States v. McConnell, No. 08-4773,
2009 WL 1262404, at *2 (4th Cir. May 8, 2009); United States v. Wilson, No. 08-4789, 2009 WL
1262401, at *2 (4th Cir. May 8, 2009) (per curiam).
125. It was impossible to ascertain the direction of one variance that the court affirmed. See
United States v. Walker, 439 F. App’x. 822 (11th Cir. 2011).
126. Again, this is consistent with pre-Booker research, which documents that the Eleventh
Circuit “rejected downward departure factors almost as consistently as it affirmed upward de-
partures.”  Gelacak et al., supra note 105, at 350. R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL109.txt unknown Seq: 27 10-APR-17 11:07
2016] DE FACTO MANDATORY 77
3. Preference for Downward Variances
The Seventh Circuit conversely appeared to show a preference for
downward variances.  The court reviewed 18 total variances, 11 of
which were upward variances and 7 of which were downward vari-
ances.  The court reversed upward at almost three times the rate of
downward, reversing approximately 13% of downward variances and
33% of upward variances.127
D. Size of Variance (Percentage Terms)128
1. Methodology
For the purpose of this analysis, the survey divided variances into
percentiles based on the relationship between the variant sentence im-
posed and the nearest guideline sentence to the variant sentence, by
comparing upward variances to the high end of the applicable guide-
line range and downward variances to the low end and reporting them
in 10 percent increments (0–10%, 10–20%, etc., of the applicable
guideline sentence).129  For the purpose of calculating the size of vari-
ances, the study treated any sentence other than imprisonment (house
arrest, community corrections center, residential treatment center,
probation/supervised release) as a sentence of zero months imprison-
ment.130  In the case of both upward and downward variances, the per-
centage of variation was calculated by dividing the sentence imposed
(the variance) by the nearest guideline sentence (high or low) and
then subtracting 100% (or 1.0) from the resulting percentage.131  For
example, if a court imposed a sentence of 90 months on an individual
127. This trend appears to be the opposite of that found by pre-Booker research, which docu-
ments that the “Seventh Circuit consistently rejected downward departures” under the
mandatory guideline scheme. Id. at 344.
128. The size of variances was not always ascertainable from the appellate opinion.  The
results reported in this section of the study are based solely on those opinions in which the size
of the variance is indicated.
129. The results in this section do not include downward variances from guidelines calling for
a sentence of life imprisonment or upward variances to life imprisonment from guidelines calling
for a sentence of a term of imprisonment, as there was no methodologically sound way to quan-
tify a term of years as a percentage of life without parole.  When a court imposed a downward
variance to some form of supervision (house arrest, probation, etc.) from a guideline range call-
ing for imprisonment, the variance was treated as a sentence of zero months imprisonment (i.e.,
a 100% downward variance from the low end of the guideline range).
130. The study also treated a sentence of twelve-months-plus-one-day imprisonment as a 12-
month sentence, even though, as a practical matter, a defendant sentenced to twelve-months-
plus-one-day in federal prison will likely serve a shorter sentence than a prisoner sentenced to
11–12 months in prison because of the eligibility for early release for good conduct. See 18
U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2012).
131. As a mathematical result, downward variances cannot exceed 100%, but upward vari-
ances can because judges cannot impose sentences of negative years imprisonment.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL109.txt unknown Seq: 28 10-APR-17 11:07
78 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:51
whose low end of the applicable guideline range was 100 months, the
resulting sentence would reflect a downward variance of 10%.  If a
court imposed a sentence of 110 months on an individual whose high
end of the applicable guideline range was 100 months, the resulting
sentence would reflect an upward variance of 10%.  The percentiles
were calculated so that a variance of exactly 10% counted in the
10–20% percentile, exactly 20% counted in the 20–30% percentile,
etc. (i.e., the percentiles were really 10% < 20%, etc.).
2. Size Matters
The size of a downward variance, by percentage, appeared to play a
significant role in the likelihood that the Second, Eighth, and Elev-
enth Circuits would reverse it as substantively unreasonable.  The Sec-
ond Circuit reviewed 12 downward variances132 in amounts ranging
from 0–39% and affirmed all but 1 of them, a relative reversal rate of
approximately 8%.  The court reviewed 8 downward variances in
amounts between 40–99% and reversed 5 of them, a relative reversal
rate of 63%.  The court reviewed 2 downward variances of 100%, vari-
ances to residential treatment and probation from low guideline
ranges of 12 and 108 months imprisonment, respectively, and reversed
both of them, a relative reversal rate of 100%.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed 24 total variances during the study pe-
riod.  It affirmed all 8 of the variances of less than 40% and affirmed
11 of the 16 variances that it reviewed of more than 40%, for relative
reversal rates of zero for small variances and 31% for larger ones.
At first glance, the Eleventh Circuit appears to favor variances that
are very large or very small, only reversing “medium-sized” variances
at a significant rate.  The court reversed only 1 of the 19 variances that
were less than 30% of the applicable guideline range and 1 of the 29
variances that were more than 60% of the applicable guideline range,
but reversed 6 of 25 variances in amounts between 30% and 60% of
the applicable guideline range.  The resulting relative reversal rates
create a visual donut effect, with small variances having a relative re-
versal rate of approximately 5%, large variances having a relative re-
versal rate of approximately 3%, and only medium-size variances
having a relative reversal rate of 24%.  While it is possible that the
circuit truly shows some preference for medium-sized variances,133 the
132. These results do not include upward variances because the Second Circuit affirmed 100%
of the upward variances it reviewed, including 6 in which the imposed sentence exceeded the
high end of the guideline range by more than 100%.
133. While one would expect courts generally to affirm small variances at a higher rate than
larger ones, the counter-intuitive result of the Eleventh Circuit data is the relatively lower rever-
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apparent donut effect appears to be accounted for by two other vari-
ables (besides the size of the variance): (1) the circuit’s preference for
upward variances over downward ones, considering only upward vari-
ances are mathematically able to exceed 100% of the applicable
guideline range,134 and (2) the small number of downward variances
of more than 30% below the low end of the applicable guideline range
that district courts in the Eleventh Circuit imposed in the first in-
stance.  When one analyzes only downward variances, the “donut”
disappears, with the size of the variance playing a more predictable
(and significant) role in the likelihood that a variant sentence would
be affirmed on appeal.  The court reversed 1 out of 15 downward vari-
ances that were less than 30% below the low end of the guideline
range, 4 out of 13 downward variances that were between 30–60%
below the low end of the guideline range, and 1 of the only 2 total
downward variances that were between 60–100% below the low end
of the guideline range.  This results in relative reversal rates of less
than 7% for small downward variances, approximately 31% for me-
dium-sized downward variances, and 50% for large downward
variances.
The size of the variance, by percentage, appeared to play some role,
albeit not as significant, in the likelihood that the Third Circuit would
reverse the sentence as substantively unreasonable.  The court re-
viewed 18 variances that were less than 50% above or below the re-
spective guidelines and reversed 4 of them, for a relative reversal rate
of less than 30%.135  The court reviewed 5 variances that were be-
tween 50–100% above or below the respective guidelines and re-
versed 2 of them, for a relative reversal rate of 40%.  The court
reviewed 5 variances of 100% or more above or below the respective
guidelines and reversed 3 of them, for a relative reversal rate of 60%.
The size of the variance in the Seventh Circuit, by percentage, ap-
peared to play a small role, although the total number of variances
was so small in the Seventh Circuit that the results may not be statisti-
cally significant.  The court reversed 2 out of 13 variances of less than
50% below or above the applicable guidelines, 2 out of 4 variances of
sal rate of very high variances in comparison to medium-sized ones.  One possible explanation
for a significant decline in the rate at which variances are reversed when they grow from some-
what sizeable to very large could be that district courts are more careful about making a record
for the reason for variances as those variances become larger.
134. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. R
135. These results omit one anomalous case in which the Third Circuit reversed a downward
variance of 40% below the applicable guideline sentence because it was insufficient (i.e., the
below-guideline sentence was unreasonably high). See United States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530,
532–33 (3d Cir. 2009).
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50–100% of the applicable guidelines, and 1 out of 2 variances of
more than 100% of the applicable high end of the guideline range, for
a relative reversal rate of approximately 15% for variances of less
than 50% and 50% for variances of more than 50%.
The size of the variance, by percentage, appeared to play some role
in the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, but only at the extremes.  The
Fourth Circuit affirmed 19 of the 21 variances of less than 100%, but 6
of the 10 variances of more than 100%, for relative reversal rates of
less than 10% and 60%, respectively.136  This is particularly notewor-
thy given that these variances in excess of 100%, under the methodol-
ogy employed to reach these results, could only be upward variances
and that the Fourth Circuit generally showed a significantly higher
likelihood of reversing downward variances than upward ones.137
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed 32 of the 35 variances of less
than 100%, but reversed 3 of the 8 variances of more than 100%, for
relative reversal rates of less than 9% and 38% respectively.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed 19 of the 20 variances of less than 200%
but 2 of the 4 variances of more than 200% that it reviewed, for rela-
tive reversal rates of 5% and 50%.  The one less than 200% variance
that it reversed was a downward variance of approximately 62%.138
3. No Apparent Impact
The First Circuit and Fifth Circuits affirmed all of the variances that
they reviewed, apparently without regard to the size of the variance in
relation to the underlying guideline range.  The greatest upward vari-
ance that the First Circuit affirmed, by percentage, was an upward
variance of 227%, affirming a 75-month sentence of imprisonment
when the applicable guideline range was 27–33 months.139  The great-
est downward variance that it affirmed, by percentage, was a down-
ward variance of 95%, affirming a 3-month sentence of imprisonment
when the applicable guideline range was 63–78 months
imprisonment.140
The greatest upward variance that the Fifth Circuit affirmed, by
percentage, was an upward variance of 567%, affirming a 60-month
sentence of imprisonment when the applicable guideline range was
136. These results omit one upward variance that was imposed pursuant to a plea agreement
that included a charge bargain to avoid a higher mandatory-minimum sentence. See United
States v. Brown, No. 09-4122, 2009 WL 2843578, at *1–2 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 2009) (per curiam).
137. See supra Part III.C.
138. See United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1302 (10th Cir. 2009).
139. See United States v. Brown, 631 F.3d 573, 580 (1st Cir. 2011).
140. See United States v. Thurston, 544 F.3d 22, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2008).
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3–9 months.141  The greatest downward variance that the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, by percentage, was a downward variance of 100%, affirming
a sentence of probation when the applicable guideline range was
27–33 months imprisonment.142
The Ninth Circuit affirmed all but 1 of the 151 variances, an upward
variance of 33%.143  The highest variance that the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed was an upward variance of 414%.144
4. Inconclusive
The data set in the D.C. Circuit is too small from which to draw
meaningful conclusions about the effect that the size of the variance,
by percentage, had on the court’s likelihood to reverse or affirm.145
E. Size of Variance (Number of Months)
1. Methodology
For the purpose of this analysis, the survey divided variances into
categories based on the total size of the variance by months; compar-
ing upward variances to the high end of the applicable guideline range
and downward variances to the low end and reporting them in decile
increments (0–10 months, 10–20 months, etc., above or below the ap-
plicable guideline sentence).146  For example, if a court imposed a sen-
tence of 90 months on an individual whose low end of the applicable
141. See United States v. Simmons, No. 07-60646, 2008 WL 1897718, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 30,
2008) (per curiam).
142. See United States v. Duhon, 541 F.3d 391, 394, 399 (5th Cir. 2008).
143. See United States v. Burgum, 633 F.3d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 2011).
144. See United States v. Fitch, 659 F.3d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 2011).
145. The D.C. Circuit only reviewed 4 variances whose values could be computed as a per-
centage of the applicable guideline range. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 597 F.3d 1329, 1332,
1334 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming a sentence of 208 months imprisonment when Mejia’s applica-
ble guideline range called for 10 years to life imprisonment).  It reversed two of the variances:
one upward variance of 100%, see In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (revers-
ing the district court’s upward variance to a term of 18 months imprisonment from a guideline
range of 3–9 months), and one downward variance of 20%, see In re Sealed Case, 552 F.3d 841,
842, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reversing the district court’s downward variance to a term of 97
months imprisonment from a guideline range of 121–51 months).  It affirmed the other two
variances whose value could be calculated, an upward variance of 105%, see United States v.
Ventura, 650 F.3d 746, 747–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming Ventura’s 84-month sentence when his
applicable guideline range was 33–41 months), and a downward variance of 100%, see United
States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming Gardellini’s sentence of
probation when his applicable guideline range was 10–16 months imprisonment).
146. The results in this section do not include downward variances from guidelines calling for
a sentence of life imprisonment or upward variances to life imprisonment from guidelines calling
for a sentence of a term of imprisonment because there was no methodologically sound way to
quantify a term of years as a percentage of life without parole.  When a court imposed a down-
ward variance to some form of supervision (house arrest, probation, etc.) from a guideline range
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guideline range was 100 months, the resulting sentence would reflect a
downward variance of 10 months.  The deciles were calculated so that
a variance of 10 months counted in the 10–20 month decile, 20 months
counted in the 20–30 month decile, etc. (i.e., the deciles were really 10
months to less than 20 months, etc.).
2. Size Still Matters
Like the size of the variance in percentage terms, the size of the
variance in terms of total months also played a role in the Second,
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.  The Second Circuit reviewed
14 total variances of less than 30 months and affirmed all but one of
them, a relative reversal rate of approximately 7%.  The 7 of them, a
relative reversal rate of approximately 37%.
The Seventh Circuit reviewed 12 variances of fewer than 40 months
and reversed 2 of them, for a relative reversal rate of 17%.  The court
reviewed 7 variances of 50 or more months and reversed 3 of them,147
for a relative reversal rate of 43%.
The pattern for the Eighth Circuit appeared at the extremes, al-
though that is likely true because the court reviewed only 1 variance
of between 50 and 80 months.148  The court reviewed 18 variances of
fewer than 80 months and reversed 2 of them, for a relative reversal
rate of 11%.  The court reviewed 6 variances of 80 or more months
and reversed 3 of them, for a relative reversal rate of 50%.149
The Tenth Circuit appeared to be highly sensitive to the size of the
total variance in months.  Of the 25 variances that the court reviewed,
it reversed only the 3 largest: variances of 94, 135, and 159 months,
respectively.150
calling for imprisonment, the variance was treated as a sentence of zero months imprisonment
(i.e., a 100% downward variance from the low end of the guideline range).
147. The court did not review any variances between 40 and 50 months.
148. See United States v. O’Connor, 567 F.3d 395, 396, 398 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming a 120-
month sentence when O’Connor’s advisory guideline range was 188–235 months imprisonment).
149. These data are not clear-cut.  When one separates large variances by months (80–100
months) from very large variances by months (more than 200 months), the court reversed 100%
of the large ones and affirmed 100% of the very large ones.
150. See United States v. Lente, 647 F.3d 1021, 1023–24 (10th Cir. 2011) (reversing Lente’s
192-month sentence on remand); United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1302 (10th Cir. 2009)
(reversing Friedman’s 57 month sentence when his applicable guideline range was 151–88
months imprisonment); United States v. Lente, 2009 WL 1143167, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr. 29, 2009)
(per curiam) (reversing Lente’s 216-month sentence when his applicable guideline range was
46–57 months imprisonment), abrogated by United States v. Story, 635 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir.
2011) (holding that increasing incarceration to promote rehabilitative goals is not permitted
under § 3582(a)).
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The size of the variance, by month, had a clearer correlation than
the size of the variance, by percentage, with the likelihood that the
Eleventh Circuit would reverse.  Though the court again reversed
fairly large variances (40–70%) at an even higher rate than exception-
ally large variances (80% or more).  This pattern seems to be signifi-
cant in light of the fact that it holds over the size of variances in both
percentage and raw-month terms and may be accounted for by the
fact that upward variances are much more capable of being extraordi-
narily large in size than downward variances (since a court cannot im-
pose a sentence of negative time).  The Eleventh Circuit reviewed 33
variances of less than 30 months and reversed only 1 of them, resulting
in a relative reversal rate for small variances of approximately 3%.
The court reviewed 42 variances of 30 months or more and reversed 7
of them, for a relative reversal rate of approximately 17%.  The court
reversed neither of the 2 sentences of more than 200 months (the two
extraordinarily large variances).
3. No Apparent Impact
The First and Fifth Circuits affirmed all of the variances that they
reviewed, apparently without regard to the size of the variance in rela-
tion to the underlying guideline range.151  The greatest upward vari-
ance that the First Circuit affirmed, by months, was an upward
variance of 49 months, affirming a 240-month sentence of imprison-
ment for a defendant whose advisory guideline range was 177–191
months.152  The greatest downward variance that it affirmed, by
months, was a downward variance of 91 months, affirming a 144-
month sentence of imprisonment for a defendant whose advisory
guideline range was 235–93 months.153  The greatest upward variance
that the Fifth Circuit affirmed, by months, was a whopping 460-month
upward variance, affirming a 1,082-month sentence imposed upon a
defendant whose advisory guideline range was (an apparently insuffi-
cient) 360–622 months imprisonment.154  The greatest downward vari-
ance that is affirmed was a 120-month downward variance, affirming a
240 month sentence for a defendant whose advisory guideline range
was 360 months to life imprisonment.155
151. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. R
152. See United States v. Vega-Santiago, 519 F.3d 1, 2, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (en banc).
153. See United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 88, 98 (1st Cir. 2008).
154. See United States v. Walters, No. 08-51223, 2009 WL 2903705, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 11,
2009) (per curiam).
155. See United States v. Murray, 648 F.3d 251, 252–53 (5th Cir. 2011).
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Unlike when analyzed by percentage, when analyzed by number of
months, the size of the variance did not seem to affect the likelihood
that it would be affirmed or reversed in the Third, Fourth, or Sixth
Circuits.156  The Third Circuit reviewed 23 variances of fewer than 50
months and affirmed 17 of them, for a relative reversal rate of approx-
imately 26%.  The court reviewed 10 variances of 50 months or more
and affirmed 7 of them, including 4 sentences with variances of more
than 100 months, for a relative reversal rate of approximately 30%.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed 26 variances of fewer than 50 months
and reversed 6 of them, for a relative reversal rate of approximately
23%.  The Fourth Circuit reviewed 14 variances of more than 50
months and reversed 4 of them, for a relative reversal rate of 29%.157
The Sixth Circuit reviewed 28 variances of fewer than 50 months
and reversed 5 of them, for a relative reversal rate of 19%.  The court
reviewed 15 variances of 50 or more months and reversed only 1 of
them, for a relative reversal rate of 7%.  If anything, the total size of
the variance by months inversely affected the likelihood of its reversal
in the Sixth Circuit.158
4. Inconclusive
The Ninth Circuit reviewed 8 variances of fewer than 50 months and
reversed 1 of them, for a relative reversal rate of 13%.  The court
reviewed 5 variances of more than 50 months and reversed 1 of them,
for a relative reversal rate of 20%.159
156. This finding seems intuitive.  The “size” of a variance seems more meaningful by percent-
age than by raw months (i.e., a 24-month variance downward from a 30-month guideline seems
like a meaningful commentary of the disproportionality of the guidelines when applied to the
individual defendant’s case while a twenty-four-month variance downward from a 360-month
guideline seems like a token concession).
157. These data are somewhat skewed by a single, multiple co-defendant case, in which the
Fourth Circuit reversed variances of 119, 203, and 222 months, respectively. See United States v.
Monroe, Nos. 08-5050, 08-5051, 08-5052, 2010 WL 3721524, at *6 (4th Cir. Sept. 20, 2010) (per
curiam).
158. This finding is likely statistically anomalous in light of the positive effect that variances
had, by percentage, on reversal in the circuit and the relatively few large variances, by month,
that the court reviewed.
159. While, standing alone, 20% is significantly larger than 13%, it would be hard to draw a
conclusion that the size of the variance, by months, affected the Ninth Circuit’s likelihood of
reversal in light of the small number (2) of total variances that it reversed, 1 of 45% and 1 of
516%.  At best, one might be able to extrapolate that the Ninth Circuit favors very small vari-
ances (fewer than 40 months), but the size of the data set probably does not allow even for that
conclusion.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL109.txt unknown Seq: 35 10-APR-17 11:07
2016] DE FACTO MANDATORY 85
The data set in the D.C. Circuit is too small from which to draw
meaningful conclusions about the effect that the size of the variance in
months, had on the court’s likelihood to reverse or affirm it.160
F. Case Type
1. Methodology
This Article categorized the cases in which variances were reviewed
for reasonableness by broad case types and analyzed the five most
common types of cases that occurred in each circuit161 to see if there
were any correlations between the type of crime involved and the like-
lihood that a circuit court would affirm or reverse a variance (and in
what direction).  The types of cases analyzed fell into the following
categories: drugs, guns, child pornography, immigration, white-collar
(e.g., bank and wire fraud), bank robbery, and violent person crimes
(e.g., murder).162  The purpose of this analysis was to ascertain if any
circuits were demonstrating a systematic approval or disapproval of
the guideline ranges for particular types of offenses in their relative
treatment of variances from the applicable guidelines on appeal.
2. No Apparent Impact
The First Circuit and Fifth Circuits affirmed all of the variances that
they reviewed, apparently without regard to the underlying crime
charged.163
160. Of the 4 variances whose values could be computed by months that the D.C. Circuit
reviewed, it reversed 2 of the variances, 1 upward variance of 9 months, see In re Sealed Case,
527 F.3d 188, 192–93 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and 1 downward variance of 24 months, see In re Sealed
Case, 552 F.3d 841, 842–44 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  It affirmed the other 2 variances whose value could
be calculated, an upward variance of 43 months, see United States v. Ventura, 650 F.3d 746,
747–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and a downward variance of 10 months, see United States v. Gardellini,
545 F.3d 1089, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
161. These data reflect the five most common types of cases to involve appeals of the reasona-
bleness of the sentence imposed.  For a variety of reasons, including selection, this may not
correlate with the most common types of cases charged and/or types of convictions appealed
within the circuit generally.  These data do not include sentences imposed for violations of pro-
bation or supervised release because there was often no way to separate the crime type of the
underlying case from the nature of the supervision violation (e.g., failing a drug test or commit-
ting a new-law violation) for the purpose of analyzing case type.
162. If a case involved multiple types of charges or a single charge that could fall into multiple
categories (e.g., use of a firearm in conjunction with drug trafficking or money laundering drug
proceeds), the author made a subjective judgment about the primary type of crime based on the
facts of the case.
163. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. R
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3. Crime Type Matters
The five most common types of sentences reviewed in the Third
Circuit were in cases involving drugs, guns, child pornography, white-
collar, and bank robbery.  The type of case appeared to make a signifi-
cant difference in the likelihood that the Third Circuit would affirm or
reverse a variance.  The Third Circuit reviewed 10 variances in cases
involving drug trafficking, 2 upward variances and 8 downward vari-
ances, and the court affirmed all but 1 of them, a downward vari-
ance,164 for a relative reversal rate of approximately 13% of the
downward drug variances.  By contrast, the Third Circuit reviewed 7
variances in white-collar cases, 6 downward and 1 upward, and the
court reversed 4 of the 6 downward variances, for a relative reversal
rate of approximately 67% of the downward white-collar variances.
There were only three types of cases in the Seventh Circuit data set
for which more than one sentence was reviewed for substantive rea-
sonableness during the study period: drugs, guns, and white-collar
crime, but the type of case may make a difference in the results of
review between those three categories.  In drug and gun cases, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed all (100%) of the downward variances, but it
reversed 3 of the 6 upward variances, for a relative reversal rate of
50%.  By contrast, in white-collar cases, the data set was so small and
one-directional (2 downward variances) that it the comparative results
are not statistically significant.  The court reversed 1 of the 2 down-
ward variances that it reviewed, for a relative reversal rate of 50%.
The five most common types of cases reviewed by the Eighth Cir-
cuit for substantive reasonableness were: drugs, guns, child pornogra-
phy, white-collar, and violent crimes.  The Eighth Circuit’s relative
deference to in-guideline sentences made it difficult to detect a case-
type difference, although it did show more of a willingness to reverse
variance sentences in child pornography cases, up or down, than its
overall reversal rate for variances, with a 50% reversal rate for vari-
ances in child pornography cases compared with 19% of variances
overall.
There were only four types of cases in the Ninth Circuit data set for
which more than one sentence was reviewed for substantive reasona-
bleness during the study period: white-collar, drugs, immigration, and
violent crimes.165  While the overall number of reviewed sentences
164. See United States v. Wells, No. 06-1456, 2008 WL 2123337, at *1 (3d Cir. May 21, 2008)
(reversing Wells’s 174-month sentence when his corresponding guideline range was 210–62
months imprisonment).
165. The violent-crime category included bank robbery, terrorism, and arson cases, none of
which individually was numerous enough to warrant individual categorization.
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from which to draw a case-type conclusion was fairly small, the Ninth
Circuit appeared to be significantly more likely to reverse a sentence
as unreasonable in cases involving violent crimes.  The Ninth Circuit
affirmed all (100%) of the variances that it reviewed in white-collar,
drug, and immigration cases, but reversed 67% of the variances that it
reviewed in cases involving violent crimes, without apparent regard to
the size or direction of the variance.
The Tenth Circuit showed a similar split between violent and nonvi-
olent crimes.  The five most common types of cases reviewed by the
Tenth Circuit for substantive reasonableness were: child pornography,
immigration, murder, drugs, and white-collar crimes.  Like the Ninth
Circuit, the Tenth Circuit affirmed all (100%) of the variances that it
reviewed, without regard to size or direction, except in murder cases,
in which it reversed 67% of them.
4. Inconclusive
The five most common types of sentences reviewed in the Second
Circuit were in cases involving drugs, guns, child pornography, immi-
gration, and white-collar crimes. No significant impact by case type
was seen in the Second Circuit, possibly because the data set was too
small for any meaningful pattern to emerge.166
The five most common types of sentences reviewed by the Fourth
Circuit, by case type, involved drugs, guns, immigration, white-collar
crimes, and bank robbery.  The Fourth Circuit’s strong preference for
upward variances (i.e., the tendency to affirm upward variances and
reverse downward ones)167 may have obscured any impact by case
type.  In the cases involving these five most common types of crimes,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed all upward variances (100%) and reversed
all downward variances (100%), except in drug cases.  The court re-
viewed 6 cases involving variances of sentences for drug trafficking
crimes and affirmed all of them (100%), 4 of which were upward vari-
ances and 2 of which were downward variances, but the data set of
drug cases (6 total) is too small from which to draw a definitive con-
clusion about the significance of case type in determining the court’s
likelihood of reversal.
166. For example, the most common type of case for which a variance sentence was appealed
for substantive reasonableness in the Second Circuit was drug cases.  The Second Circuit re-
viewed 10 variances in drug cases, 1 involving an upward variance and 9 involving downward
variances.  The Second Circuit affirmed the upward variance, affirmed 6 of the downward vari-
ances, and reversed 3 of the downward variances.  This is consistent with the Second Circuit’s
overall pattern of relatively high likelihood of reversing downward variances, across case types
(27% of the time). See supra Part III.C.
167. See supra Part III.C.
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The five most common types of sentences reviewed by the Sixth
Circuit, by case type, involved drugs, guns, immigration, white-collar
crimes, and child pornography.  The Sixth Circuit’s relative deference
to district court sentences created a data set of reversals that was too
small from which to draw any conclusions about case-type
preferences.168
At first glance, the Eleventh Circuit appeared to have a case-type
correlation with the likelihood of reversal, but, when the direction of
the variance was also taken into consideration, the results instead
seem to be explained by the Eleventh Circuit’s preference for upward
variances.  The five most common case types reviewed for reasonable-
ness by the Eleventh Circuit during the study period were: white col-
lar, guns, immigration, drugs, and child pornography.  The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed of the variant sentences that it reviewed in gun and
immigration cases, while reversing several variances in white-collar,
gun, and child pornography cases.  This case-type correlation becomes
insignificant when the direction of variances imposed by the district
courts in the data set is considered.  In the cases under review, the
district courts, collectively, departed upward in approximately 86% of
the gun cases and approximately 81% of the immigration cases that
the Eleventh Circuit reviewed for substantive reasonableness.  By
comparison, the district courts, collectively, departed downward in a
majority of the other reviewed cases: in approximately 64% of the
reviewed drug cases, approximately 63% of the reviewed white-collar
cases, and 50% of the reviewed child pornography cases.  The case-
type divergence in the direction of variances at the district court (or
notice of appeal) level in conjunction with the Eleventh Circuit’s pref-
erence for upward variances, rather than the circuit court’s case-type
preference, therefore, seems to account for this variation by case type
on review.
168. See supra Part III.B.  The Sixth Circuit does not show extraordinary deference to the
sentencing court, but, of the courts that are identified as retaining appellate discretion to review
sentences, the Sixth Circuit did so at the smallest rate (approximately 10% of the time across the
board).  Once that reversal rate was spread over the 5 most common case types reviewed for
sentencing reasonableness in the Sixth Circuit, the resulting individual case-type data sets were
too small from which to draw further conclusions.  For example, the 2 most common types of
sentences that the Sixth Circuit reviewed were those involving white-collar crime and child por-
nography.  The court reviewed 10 variances in white-collar cases, 6 upward variances and 4
downward variances, reversing 2 of the upward variances and affirming the rest.  The court re-
viewed 11 variances in cases involving child pornography, 6 upward variances and 5 downward
variances, and reversed 1 of the downward variances, affirming the rest.  On the surface, the
difference between a 20% and 9% relative reversal rate between the 2 case types may seem
meaningful, but it is the difference of only 1 reversal and therefore too insignificant a difference
from which to extrapolate any greater correlation.
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The data set in the D.C. Circuit was too small from which to draw
any conclusions about the effect of case type on the court’s review of
variances.
H. Narrative Analysis: The Geography of Sentencing
When these various data points are put together, a portrait emerges.
Justice Scalia was right.  Post-Booker, the individual circuits have de-
veloped sentencing “personalities.”  The mismatch of advisory guide-
lines and unguided reasonableness review has reanimated the lack of
uniformity that existed before the adoption of the guidelines.  A de-
fendant’s treatment, and therefore ultimate sentence, depends on
where the crime occurred.  What follows is a narrative interpretation
of the analyses.
1. Circuits in Which the District Courts Rule
In the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, defendants should really care
about their individual sentencing judge at the district court level be-
cause all three circuits show extraordinary deference to district court
sentences, including variant ones.  Sentencing deference in these cir-
cuits is exercised at the time of sentencing and not on substantive rea-
sonableness review.  This is particularly true in the Fifth Circuit, which
has formally adopted a presumption of reasonableness for guideline
sentences and has affirmed all of the variances that it reviewed during
the course of the study.  It is slightly less true in the Tenth Circuit,
which, despite having a high rate of affirmance overall, demonstrated
discomfort with variances that were particularly large.  Together, these
circuits appear to engage in exactly the approval of “virtually any sen-
tence within the statutory range that the sentencing court imposes, so
long as the district judge goes through the appropriate formalities,”
exactly that which Justice Scalia predicted in Booker.169
2. Appellate Discretion
At the other end of the spectrum, sentences in the Sixth Circuit are
effectively determined in Cincinnati, so defendants should really care
about the composition of the three-judge panel that they draw to re-
view their sentences for reasonableness on appeal.  The court shows
significantly less deference to district court sentences on appeal, and it
demonstrates more willingness to reverse sentences that it finds to be
substantively unreasonable, without significant consideration of the
size or direction of the variance.
169. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 312 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
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3. Time Warp: De Facto Mandatory Guidelines
In the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits, defendants’ sentences are
still decided by the United States Sentencing Commission in Washing-
ton, D.C., so their biggest concern should be the Commission’s pro-
mulgation of the guidelines.  The Second and Third Circuits, in theory,
espouse a willingness to engage in meaningful substantive reasonable-
ness review, but, in practice, they fail to do so.  Both courts rejected
Rita’s invitation to presume that in-guideline sentences are reasona-
ble170 and have even held that sentences within the child pornography
guidelines are presumptively unreasonable.171  Nonetheless, when the
pattern of individual cases is analyzed, both courts show significantly
more deference to in-guideline sentences than to variances on review
and appear to be particularly uncomfortable affirming large down-
ward variances.
The Eighth Circuit also remains highly guideline bound, although,
in this circuit, that is a conscious doctrinal choice.  The court has for-
mally adopted a presumption of reasonableness when reviewing in-
guideline sentences,172 and, consistent with that presumption, shows
significantly more deference to in-guideline sentences than to vari-
ances on appeal.  In keeping with its deference to the guidelines, the
size of variances plays a significant role in the court’s willingness to
affirm them.  Not only are in-guideline sentences “safer” on appeal in
the Eighth Circuit, but the farther away from the applicable guideline
range that the district court strays, the more likely the appellate court
is to find the sentence substantively unreasonable.
4. Severe Sentences
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits are just bad places to be sen-
tenced as a defendant.  The Fourth Circuit’s theory and practice align
in its adherence to the guidelines.  The court has adopted a presump-
tion of reasonableness for in-guideline sentences.  Consistent with that
presumption the court shows significantly more deference to in-guide-
line sentences than to variances.  The only time that the court shows a
willingness to engage in meaningful sentencing review is when it af-
firms upward variances, without regard to the size of the variance.
The Eleventh Circuit shows much more overall deference to district
court sentences than the Fourth Circuit does, overall, but the Eleventh
Circuit is more likely to affirm an upward variance than a downward
170. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. R
171. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. R
172. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. R
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one.  At the same time, it is particularly likely to reverse large down-
ward variances.
5. Sentencing Relief
In contrast, Booker appears to have made the Seventh Circuit at
least a slightly better place in which to be sentenced as a defendant.
The court has also embraced its post-Booker discretion, although it is
less comfortable affirming larger variances and upward variances of
any size.
6. Unused Discretion
The Ninth Circuit should fall into the “Appellate Discretion” cate-
gory, except that in the Ninth Circuit defendants do not seem to be
appealing their sentences very often.  The court shows significantly
less deference to district court sentences on appeal and more willing-
ness to reverse sentences that it finds to be substantively unreasona-
ble, treating in-guideline sentences and variances essentially the same
on appeal; however, the circuit has relatively few appeals of guideline
sentences (by defendants) for substantive reasonableness.173
I. Issues for Future Study
The data give rise to several questions outside of the scope of this
study and the appeals-level data collected, thus warranting future
study: the extent of district-by-district sentencing variations, in partic-
ular within the “District Court Deference” circuits identified in this
study;174 the relationship between a particular circuit’s rate of af-
firming variances, reversing in-guideline sentences, and the number of
variances imposed at the district court level (a causation problem);175
the relationship between a particular circuit’s rate of affirming vari-
ances, reversing in-guideline sentences, and the percentage of
sentences (in-guideline and variances) that are appealed (a selection
problem) (e.g., few defendants appeal their in-guideline sentences as
unreasonable in the Ninth Circuit even though the court has shown a
real willingness to reverse them); and the relationship between the
number/rate of Anders briefs within a circuit (particularly in the
173. The data set of cases in the D.C. Circuit is too small to draw any conclusions about
sentencing “personality.”
174. See, e.g., Gelacak et al., supra note 105, at 360 (finding “large variations in departure R
practice among district courts within circuits” under the pre-Booker mandatory guideline
scheme).
175. See id. at 358 (finding a link, pre-Booker, “between a circuit court’s appellate jurispru-
dence and the actual departure behavior of district judges”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL109.txt unknown Seq: 42 10-APR-17 11:07
92 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:51
Fourth Circuit, where that number/rate seems disproportionately
high) and that circuit’s rate of reversing sentences on appeal.  The
study also did not consider or address caseload, prosecutorial deci-
sions, the role of plea or cooperation agreements, or disparities at the
district court level (with the possible exception of those created or
driven by the appellate-review practice of the circuit in which a partic-
ular district is located), all of which may provide alternate explana-
tions of some of the initial narrative impressions of the circuits.
V. PRELIMINARY IMPLICATIONS FROM THE RESULTS
A. Conclusions
Tens of thousands of people are convicted of federal crimes each
year.176  Complete information about the operation of the federal
courts post-Booker is essential to improving the fairness and effective-
ness of their functioning.  These data have a great deal of political and
practical importance.
Other studies have documented that, since Booker, the average
length of sentences for most offenses has not changed significantly
and most judges have continued to impose in-guideline sentences.177
This study demonstrates that the result of the Booker/Fanfan, Gall/
Kimbrough, and Rita line of cases is that federal sentences are deter-
mined more by individual district and judge than by an individualized
evaluation of each sentence for reasonableness at the appellate level,
resulting in disparities between both similarly situated defendants who
receive radically different sentences and differently situation defend-
ants who receive similar ones because they are sentenced in different
districts/circuits.  In other words, two defendants committing the same
crime under the same circumstances may receive very different
sentences depending on the sentencing idiosyncrasies of each defen-
dant’s particular judge.  Meaningful appellate review of sentences is
critical to assure that there is a proper balance between avoidance of
176. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FIS-
CAL YEAR 2015 (2016), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/re-
search-publications/2016/FY15_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf.
177. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. N (2009), http://www.ussc.gov/
about/2015-annual-report/archive/annual-report-2009 (noting that in Fiscal Year 2009, 56.8% of
federal sentences were imposed within the applicable guideline range, 25.3% were the result of a
government-sponsored downward variance, and only 17.9% were imposed outside of the appli-
cable guidelines range without the government’s motion).  To compare, prior to Booker, defend-
ants received in-guideline sentences in approximately two-thirds to three-fourths of cases. See
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, ANNUAL RE-
PORT 2004 49 fig. G (2004) (noting percentages of in-guideline sentences from 1992–2004 be-
tween 64–78%).
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unjustified disparities and recognition of the importance of individual-
izing sentences to reflect the totality of the circumstances regarding an
offender and their offense.
The Supreme Court’s remedial opinion in Booker and its progeny
have left the federal circuit courts of appeal with two separate but
interrelated options: (1) whether to engage in a formal presumption of
the substantive reasonableness of in-guideline sentences under Rita;178
and (2) whether to engage in meaningful or purely formal (“rubber
stamp”) review of the substantive reasonableness of a sentence in in-
dividual cases regardless of whether such sentences are within or
outside the applicable guideline range.179  The result is a tripartite di-
vision among the circuits.
The first category of circuits comprises circuits that employ a pre-
sumption of substantive reasonableness, resulting in a rubber stamp of
in-guideline sentences and a near-universal rejection of sentencing
variances.180  The second category of circuits comprises those that do
not employ a presumption of substantive reasonableness for in-guide-
line sentences but rather rubber stamp all sentences, so long as the
district court  indicated that it understood the discretion that it was
exercising, which has increasingly become conflated with a review of
procedural reasonableness.  The third category of circuits neither em-
ploys a presumption of substantive reasonableness for in-guideline
sentences nor rubber stamps any sentences.181
Only sentences within the third category of circuits comply with the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and the Fifth Amendment
rights to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a grand jury indict-
ment.  Only these sentences embody the advisory-guideline system
envisioned by the Court in Booker as a remedy for its constitutional
holding.
Circuits that employ a de jure presumption of reasonableness for in-
guideline sentences and a de facto presumption of unreasonableness
for variant sentences have created a circuit-wide de facto mandatory
178. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262–65 (2005).
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Rita, Claiborne, and the Courts of
Appeals’ Attachment to the Sentencing Guidelines, 19 F. SENT’G REP. 171, 174 (2007) (noting “a
larger pattern of resistance by the courts of appeals to the Supreme Court’s efforts to reconstruct
the law of sentencing” in Booker).
181. While it is theoretically possible to have a fourth category of circuit courts—ones that
employ a presumption of reasonableness for in-guideline sentences while rubber stamping
sentences below or above the guideline range—given the philosophical inconsistency between
rubber stamping and employing a strong presumption of guideline sentences, there are presently
no circuits that this Article would categorize in this way.
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guideline regime, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and
Booker and Fanfan.
Circuits that employ no presumption of reasonableness, but simply
rubber stamp all district court sentences, violate the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments in a more subtle way.  By affirming essentially all dis-
trict court sentences so long as they are procedurally reasonable, these
circuits have created a de facto mandatory guideline system within
some of their districts or even individual courtrooms—namely, those
districts and courtrooms in which judges, while articulating the knowl-
edge that they are permitted to impose a below-guideline sentence
never actually do so, but nonetheless have their guideline sentences
routinely affirmed at the circuit level.  The “excessive sentencing dis-
parities”182 that result from the luck of the draw of individual sentenc-
ing judge (judge that will vary from the guideline when appropriate v.
judge who always imposes guideline sentences) in these circuits is sim-
ilarly unconstitutional.
B. Limitations
This study suffers from two distinct limitations.  First, it is based
entirely on data from reported appellate-court opinions (i.e., cases in
which a district court’s sentencing decision has been challenged and
the appellate court has published its decision reviewing the sentence).
In addition to excluding contested sentences that are not appealed
(and perhaps some contested sentences that are appealed but whose
appeals are not reported), it also excluded most sentences that are
imposed after a negotiated guilty plea.183  This latter exclusion is par-
ticularly significant in the federal system, because the federal rules of
appellate procedure generally prohibit judges from agreeing in ad-
vance to impose negotiated sentences.184  Second, it involves the col-
lection of data for only a short period of time (approximately four
years) immediately following the Court’s decisions in Gall and
Kimbrough.
C. Additional Validation
This study has provided a number of avenues for future research
regarding the sentencing consequences of Booker.  One such avenue
would be to repeat the study over a longer period of time, further
182. Booker, 543 U.S. at 312 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
183. Plea agreements generally require a waiver of the defendant’s right to appeal the sen-
tence imposed.
184. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (prohibiting the sentencing judge from participating in plea
negotiations).
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removed from the Court’s decisions in Gall and Kimbrough, to see if
the correlations that this study found continue to hold true.
A second avenue of future research would be qualitative research
involving interviews with individual judges about their decision-mak-
ing processes under the new advisory-guidelines system.  Such qualita-
tive results could support the quantitative finding of this study that, in
some districts and for some judges, the guidelines are still de facto
mandatory.
A third avenue for future research would be to replicate this study
at the district court level (i.e., using sentencing data from sentences
that do not get appealed and/or publicly reported).  The findings of
this study may be skewed by the selection of sentencing decisions for
appeal.
D. Final Thoughts
Disparities in sentencing may never be wholly eliminated, but one
of their major causes, the tension between sentencing discretion at the
district court level and substantive-reasonableness-review discretion
at the circuit court level, can and should be eliminated.  Of course, the
results of this study will only have meaning if they are actually used by
Congress and the federal judiciary to make more uniform and fair sen-
tencing decisions.
No guideline system can fully account for the circumstances that
will produce sentencing disparities, and by removing or severely limit-
ing judicial discretion in sentencing, judges cannot adjust and correct
accordingly.  A rigid system intended to reduce overall disparity actu-
ally creates disparities different than, but equally unwarranted as,
those documented in this Article.  Mandatory guidelines are overly
blunt instruments, bringing undue focus upon some factors (like crimi-
nal histories and drug quantities) to the exclusion of other important
considerations, including the defendant’s role in the offense, the pres-
ence or absence of violence, the risk of recidivism, and the personal
characteristics of the defendant.  The goal of this study, therefore, is to
provide both the courts and the public with accurate information so
that they can examine whether justice is being achieved.185
185. The alternative to rendering the USSG advisory, which was preferred by the four justices
dissenting from the Court’s remedial opinion in Booker (also constituting four-fifths of the mer-
its majority), would have been to require the prosecution to plead and prove aggravating sen-
tencing factors to the jury as elements of the offense under Apprendi.
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